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ADJUSTING ALIENABILITY
*

Lee Anne Fennell

Inalienability stood alongside property rules and liability rules in Guido
Calabresi and Douglas Melamed's celebrated Harvard Law Review article,1
but law and economics scholars have never considered it an equal partner in
the triad.2 Unlike property rules and liability rules, workhorse concepts that
permeate every corner of the economic analysis of law, inalienability enters
economic discussions mostly as an anomaly, and usually in the company of
an entitlement whose suitability for market transfer is hotly contested. A
similar pattern can be seen in property theory, where the right to exclude3
has almost entirely eclipsed any sustained consideration of alienability.4
This neglect is odd. Not only is alienability one of the standard incidents of
ownership,5 but limits on an owner's right to exclude sometimes seem to be
directly prompted by anxiety about alienability—the specter of one party
strategically acquiring a good only to resell it to a higher-valuing party.6
*
Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. For helpful comments and conversations on earlier
drafts, I thank Bob Allen, Scott Anderson, Ian Ayres, Ben Barros, Omri Ben-Shahar, Anupam Chander, Nestor
Davidson, Chris Drahozal, Chris Fennell, Bernard Harcourt, Herb Hovenkamp, Larissa Katz, Gregg Kettles, Jim
Krier, Saul Levmore, Richard McAdams, Jonathan Nash, Randy Picker, Daria Roithmayr, Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Adam Samaha, Lior Strahilevitz, Stephanie Stern, Madhavi Sunder, and Steve Yelderman. I am also grateful for
feedback on the paper from students in Lior Strahilevitz's Autumn 2008 Property Theory seminar as well as for
the comments and questions of participants in the 2008 Property Works in Progress conference, a 2008 Law and
Society panel, and faculty workshops at the University of Chicago Law School, the University of Iowa College of
Law, and the University of Kansas School of Law. I also thank the Bernard G. Sang Faculty Fund at the
University of Chicago Law School for summer research support. Catherine Kiwala and Eric Singer provided
excellent research assistance. All errors are inalienably mine.
1
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
2
See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
931, 931 (1985) ("Inalienability is the stepchild of law and economics."); Matteo Rizzolli, The Cathedral: An
Economic Survey of Legal Remedies §§2.3.3-2.4 (January 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1092144
(noting that inalienability rules play a limited role in the economic analysis of remedies). Some notable economic
treatments of inalienability include Rose-Ackerman, supra; Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation? 85
COLUM. L. REV. 970 (1985); Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 11981202 (1999); Ian Ayres & Kristin Madison, Threatening Inefficient Performance of Injunctions and Contracts,
148 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1999).
3
For a recent discussion of, and contribution to, the large body of property scholarship focused on exclusion,
see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Property, Inviolability, and Automatic
Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 593 (2008).
4
The assertion that alienability has no independent significance for property theory, but rather only
represents one facet of exclusion, does not respond to this shortfall in the literature. See Thomas W. Merrill,
Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 742-43 (1998) (arguing that exclusion encompasses all
attributes of property, including alienability). Notwithstanding this expansive claim, property theory's explorations
of exclusion have given little attention to alienability.
5
Alienability has been associated both with the right to the wealth represented by an asset and the ability to
transmit the asset to another. See Tony Honoré, Ownership, in MAKING LAW BIND 161, 170-73 (1987) (discussing
"the right to the capital" and the "incident of transmissibility").
6
See, e.g., The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VI) (listing the
offer to sell a domain name that has not been used as a factor that may indicate bad faith); eBay v. MercExchange,
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Concern about such strategic acquisition for resale surfaces in a variety of
contexts, from blackmail to cybersquatting to ticket scalping to water
speculation. Yet the connections between these concerns and alienability as
an attribute of property remain largely unexplored.
Of course, alienability has not been edged out of legal scholarship
entirely. Scholarly debate continues apace about whether particular things,
such as human organs or legal rights, should be bought and sold on the open
market.7 Here, questions of personhood, autonomy, paternalism, and the
downstream personal and societal consequences of allowing or blocking
transfers take center stage.8 The prominence of this undeniably interesting
set of questions has, I suggest, unduly cabined our thinking about
alienability. Legal theorists tend to assume that alienability limits are suited
only for special realms involving intensely personal or otherwise highly
charged entitlements, and of little or no relevance to the ordinary run of
property interests.
In this paper, I explore a less-studied side of inalienability rules: their
potential as tools for achieving efficiency (or other ends) when applied to
resources that society generally views as appropriate objects of market
transactions. Specifically, I focus on inalienability's capacity to alter
upstream decisions by would-be resellers about whether to acquire an
entitlement in the first place. By influencing these acquisition decisions,
inalienability rules can buttress or substitute for other adjustments to the
property bundle in addressing resource dilemmas. Earlier work, including a
1985 article by Susan Rose-Ackerman and a response piece by Richard
Epstein, has already established inalienability's traction as a "second-best"
method for achieving goals that cannot be cost-effectively pursued through
limits on acquisition or use alone.9 For example, alienability limits can
547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy J., concurring) (expressing concern about injunctions "employed as a
bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees"); Part I.B, infra (discussing these and other examples).
7
Hundreds of articles and books have addressed the sale of human tissue. See, e.g., Michele Goodwin,
Altruism’s Limits: Law, Capacity, and Organ Commodification, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 305 (2004). The sale of
parental rights has also been the subject of extensive debate, much of it provoked by Elisabeth M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978). Recent work on the sale
of legal rights and claims includes, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Another View of the Quagmire: Unconstitutional
Conditions and Contract Theory, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913 (2006); Steven G. Gey, Contracting Away Rights: A
Comment on Daniel Farber's "Another View of the Quagmire," 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 953 (2006); Michael
Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697 (2005); Saul Levmore, Voting with
Intensity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 111 (2000). See also Claire Priest, Creating an American Property Law: Alienability
and Its Limits in American History, 120 HARV. L. REV. 385 (2006) (addressing alienability in the context of
historical protections against creditors); Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A
Renewed Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 1246-48 (2005) (discussing the "anticommodification critique" of expansions in property).
8
A key catalyst for work in this area is Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1849 (1987). See also MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES
OF JUSTICE 100-03 (1983) (cataloguing blocked exchanges); Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, 1111-15
(discussing rationales for inalienability).
9
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 933 (observing "that inalienability rules can be second-best responses to
various kinds of market failures"); Epstein, supra note 2, at 970 (explaining that restraints on alienation can
"provide indirect control over external harms when direct means of control are ineffective to the task"); see also
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reduce pressure on common pool resources,10 elicit investments in public
goods,11 and simplify enforcement.12 This paper builds on that analysis in
three ways.
First, I examine how inalienability rules might, through ex ante effects
on acquisition incentives, reduce the incidence of costly holdout or hold-up
problems.13 Most discussions of holdout dynamics have focused on the
choice between property rules and liability rules; debate typically centers on
whether an owner's refusal to transfer an entitlement that is highly valued
by another party is sufficiently problematic to justify overriding her veto.14
Counterintuitively, however, concerns about an owner's veto power can be
addressed not only by making transfers easier (as through a liability rule)
but also by making transfers harder (as through alienability restrictions).
The former approach cuts through holdout problems in a familiar (and
familiarly problematic) way, while the latter alternative encourages the selfselection of owners who are likely to be relatively high-valuing users over
the long run.15 While inalienability's relevance to holdout problems has
been noted previously,16 the idea that inalienability rules might substitute
for liability rules in a variety of contexts remains underappreciated.
The paper's second contribution comprises a broader examination of the
substitutability and complementarity of different mechanisms for addressing
resource tragedies. The idea that inalienability can backstop or fill in for
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 268,
273 (1998) ("Inalienability is frequently useful, not as an ideal policy, but as a second-best response to the
messiness and complexity of the world.").
10
See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 2, at 978-82; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 943; Carol M. Rose, From
H20 to C02: Lessons of Water Rights for Carbon Trading, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 91, 95 (2008) (noting the potential
for trade, which "opens up a resource to everyone in the world," to "put[] too much pressure on the resource");
Shi-Ling Hsu, A Two-Dimensional Framework for Analyzing Property Rights Regimes, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
813, 870 (2003) (explaining that inalienability can protect "over-consumed resources," because "without market
value, the pressure for exploiting such resources dissipates").
11
See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 957-58 (discussing the purposes of inalienability in the
Homesteading Acts).
12
See, e.g., Epstein supra note 2, at 973-78 (giving examples involving guns, alcohol, drugs, and violencepromoting information).
13
The term "holdout" is usually associated with multi-party bargaining situations, such as those common in
land assembly contexts, while "hold-up" is more frequently used in the context of two-party instances of bilateral
monopoly. Both situations exhibit the same basic strategic dynamic; therefore, I will refer to them both as
"holdout" problems here. See infra Part II.C (discussing holdout problems).
14
See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1092, 1107 (defining liability rules and explaining how
they can overcome holdout problems); infra Part II.C.
15
See Ayres & Madison, supra note 2, at 54 (explaining how inalienability could induce plaintiffs to reveal
whether they value an injunction for its own sake or merely as leverage). One of my students, Steve Yelderman,
also raised the possibility that alienability limits on injunctions to enforce patents could induce sorting by patent
holders into different remedial regimes. The potential for alienability restrictions to induce self-selection in the
service of distributive goals is explored in Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 940 ("If policymakers wish to benefit
a particular sort of person but cannot easily identify those people ex ante, they may be able to impose restrictions
on the entitlement that are less onerous for the worthy group than for others who are nominally eligible.").
16
Ayres & Madison, supra note 2, examines how inalienable injunctions might respond to strategic remedial
choices designed to "hold up" the defendant. Michael Heller has examined how bans on fragmentation (that is,
prohibitions on alienating particular configurations) might be explained by a desire to reduce downstream holdout
problems. Heller, supra note 2, at 1176-82.
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other controls on property has not gone unrecognized,17 but the full
implications of this point have yet to be traced. Here, I examine alternative
means for addressing strategic dilemmas—whether the overharvesting or
undercultivation problems associated with commons tragedies, or the
coordination and holdout problems that are the hallmarks of anticommons
tragedies.18 Doing so sheds new light on the interdependent relationship
among limits on acquisition, use, alienability, and exclusion.
Third, the paper examines the conditions under which alienability limits
might offer a more promising point of intervention than limits on
acquisition, use, or exclusion. In comparing alternatives, it is essential to
recognize that alienability is not a binary switch to be turned on or off, but
rather a dimension of property ownership that can be adjusted in many
different ways. While any restriction on alienability carries the potential to
inefficiently block the flow of goods to higher-valuing users, carefully
designed inalienability rules might have minimal "blocking costs" in certain
settings while offering other advantages. In addition to being more easily
administrable in some contexts, inalienability rules may have the capacity to
sidestep information asymmetries by inducing self-selection by those who
highly value the entitlement.19 Perhaps most important, alienability limits
do not force sales and hence have different implications for autonomy than
liability rules. Thus, they are of particular interest in settings where
bargaining dilemmas have reached such a magnitude that some intervention
into the ownership bundle is indicated.
Significantly, inalienability rules can be consciously designed to
minimize the extent to which they lock up resources in suboptimal uses. For
example, put options can be combined with alienability limits to avoid tying
up resources in the hands of parties who, over time, become low valuers.20
Requiring the use of devices like second-price auctions can alter incentives
to strategically acquire goods that hold significant value for only one party
without blocking alienability altogether.21 Alienability limits can also be
fine-tuned to achieve other kinds of social goals. For example, limits on
alienability can remove intermediate options and force parties to make "all
or nothing" choices that may be desirable from standpoints of efficiency or
distributive justice.22
17
See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 2, at 990 ("In essence the restraint on alienation is a substitute for direct
remedies for misuse when these are costly and uncertain to administer.").
18
See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of The Anticommons, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) [hereinafter
"Anticommons"]; MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY 1-22 (2008) [hereinafter GRIDLOCK] (describing
the tragedy of the anticommons as a problem of "gridlock") Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98
NW. U. L. REV. 907, 946-48 (2004) (discussing the connection between holdout problems and the anticommons
tragedy).
19
See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 939, 946-48; infra Part III.B.2.
20
See infra Part III.C.1.
21
See infra Part III.C.2.
22
See, e.g., Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, More Is Not Always Better Than Less: An Exploration in Property
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The analysis proceeds in three Parts that roughly correspond to the
three contributions just described. Part I uses the anxiety surrounding
certain kinds of transfers as a springboard for exploring the relationship
between strategic dilemmas and alienability. Part II builds on those lessons
to present inalienability as a mechanism for managing resource tragedies.
Part III works through a menu of adjustments to alienability rights and
compares the performance of alienability restrictions with interventions at
other possible chokepoints.
Before beginning, a clarification about the scope of the project is in
order. My approach to inalienability rules in this paper is purely analytic: I
seek to examine their potential as tools, to show how they work, how they
differ from other approaches, where they might fall short, and how they
might be honed to serve desired ends better. I do not grapple with larger
questions surrounding the alienability of any specific entitlement or develop
an overarching normative theory about alienability. Nor do I tout
inalienability as the only or best answer to any particular problem or set of
problems. My goal is more modest: to get inalienability rules out of the
"special purpose" box to which they have been relegated and to convince
readers to view them as viable instruments for addressing ubiquitous, costly
dilemmas. Along the way, I hope to foster a broader rethinking of
alienability's place in property theory.
I. ANXIETY AND ALIENABILITY
Proposed transfers may make people uneasy for any number of reasons.
Many of these reasons have been extensively treated elsewhere, and I will
not attempt to recount them all here. Instead, I want to isolate a specific,
underappreciated source of concern—that the free alienability of a good,
otherwise comfortably the subject of commerce, will prompt wasteful ex
ante decisions about acquisition or use that manifest in costly resource
dilemmas. Some initial taxonomic work in Section A will mark out this area
of interest conceptually, and the examples and analysis in Sections B and C,
respectively, will flesh it out further.
A. Extrinsic Concerns, Ex Ante Effects
Two dichotomies are especially relevant to this paper's project.23 First,
Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 634. 668 (2008) (explaining how the invalidation of a condition on a grant puts the donor
to a choice between withholding the grant altogether or making it free of the condition); infra Part III.A.3.
23
Existing treatments have broken down justifications for alienability restrictions in a variety of other ways.
See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 2, at 970 (distinguishing between inalienability rules targeting "the practical control
of externalities" and those aimed at "asserted distributional weakness"); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 932-33
(identifying "[t]hree broad rationales" for restrictions: those based on "economic efficiency itself," those directed
at "certain specialized distributive goals," and those necessary to safeguard "the responsible functioning of a
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we can distinguish between "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" objections to a good's
transfer. Intrinsic objections identify features of a particular good that make
it a poor candidate for transfer or for market allocation in general. For
example, writers opposing the sale of babies, human organs, or legal rights
often allege harms intrinsic to the transfer of these items, whether framed in
terms of affronts to the personhood of the parties involved, a degrading of
the entitlement itself, or a coarsening of the sensibilities of society as a
whole.24 Extrinsic concerns about alienability, in contrast, are not based on
any inherent problem with the transfer of the entitlement in question or with
its allocation by the market; the focus is instead on alienability's
contribution, within a given structural and institutional context, to social or
economic problems that are not part and parcel of the transfer itself. By this
definition, extrinsic objections could always be addressed through means
other than alienability restrictions, although perhaps less efficiently.25
Notably, both intrinsic and extrinsic objections might be raised about
the transfer of the same good. For example, organ sales might be opposed
both out of fear that the transfer would compromise some element of
personhood and out of fear that an open market in organs would lead to
violence aimed at the involuntary harvesting of organs.26 The latter concern
is extrinsic to the sale of the good itself and could be addressed through
heightened enforcement of criminal law, although perhaps not as
effectively.27 The two primary strands of Richard Titmuss's famous
argument about the effects of markets for blood28 also illustrate how
intrinsic and extrinsic arguments may become intertwined. Part of
Titmuss's thesis focuses on the potential for commercial blood markets to
introduce lower-quality blood into the system, given the "conflict of
interests" that blood sellers (but not altruistic blood donors) have with
democratic state"); Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1111-15 (discussing how efficiency and distributive
goals might be advanced through inalienability rules); Hsu, supra note 10, at 870 (listing three categories of goals
served by alienability and inalienability); W. Stephen Westermann, A Theory of Autonomy Entitlements: One
View of the Cathedral Nave Dedicated to Constitutional Rights and Other Individual Liberties (2007) available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=977964, at 8-9 & n.19 (listing eight reasons that limits on alienability might be
adopted).
24
See, e.g., Radin, supra note 8, at 1879-86 (discussing "injury to personhood" and to "'the texture of the
human world'" associated with commodification) (quoting HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH, AND HISTORY 141
(1981)); Seth Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 1293, 1387-90 (1984) (discussing structural justifications for making rights non-waivable).
25
See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 938 (discussing inalienability as a response to market failure in
instances where "straightforward responses" like internalizing externalities are unavailable or unduly costly).
26
See, e.g., See Dean Lueck & Thomas Miceli, Property Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
183, 248 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, eds., 2007).
27
See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 549-553 (2001) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (discussing the "dry
up the market" justification for making conduct illegal, where doing so makes difficult-to-police violations less
profitable).
28
RICHARD TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY (1971). Debate
surrounding Titmuss's work on blood has been extensive. See, e.g., Kenneth Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 343 (1972); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 945-48; Emanuel D. Thorne, When Private Parts Are
Made Public Goods: The Economics of Market-Inalienability, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 149 (1998).
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respect to private information that bears on blood quality.29 This is an
extrinsic objection to alienability, given that blood quality might be
screened in other ways. A second and logically independent strand of
Titmuss's argument, however, posits that the existence of the paid market in
blood will actually drive donors out of the system.30 Here, the objection is
an intrinsic one—that merely by making blood marketable, its meaning is
altered in ways that keep it from being perceived as a meaningful gift.
Because this transformation does not occur for ordinary goods (books and
sweaters do not become inappropriate gifts merely because they are also
sold), the argument must turn on some special characteristic of the good in
question that makes its sale problematic.31
Alienability concerns can also be divided temporally into ex ante
("upstream") and ex post ("downstream") objections. Think of a proposed
transfer from A to B situated in the middle of a timeline. One set of reasons
for blocking the transfer relates to what will happen following that transfer.
Perhaps A will regret it, or will suffer unanticipated (or myopically
underrated) consequences. Maybe B will misuse the entitlement or transfer
it to others who will do so. The entitlement itself may suffer for having
been the subject of a transfer. Broader consequences may also ensue.
Perhaps the socially constructed meaning of the entitlement will erode. Or
perhaps a society in which more B's and fewer A's hold the entitlement will
be impoverished culturally or compromised distributively or morally. Thus,
ex post effects may involve the person who parts with her endowment, the
person who acquires it, the endowment itself, or society at large; they may
be couched in terms that are consequentialist or deontological; the effects
may occur immediately or take a long time to manifest.32
A different set of reasons for blocking the A to B transfer would be to
alter the upstream course of events by influencing whether and how parties
initially acquire and use the entitlement. This, too, will have downstream
consequences—indeed, that is the very point. But inalienability's role in
producing those consequences operates through an indirect mechanism.
The value added by the A to B blockade comes not from blocking the A to B
29

TITMUSS, supra note 34, at 240-46.
Id. at 223.
31
The same argument might, of course, be made with respect to a range of other goods whose sale is
challenged on intrinsic grounds—organs, sexual services, reproductive services, and so on.
32
These effects would encompass not just individual interests in the entitlement but also what have been
termed "structural" or "instrumental" justifications for the inalienability of particular endowments. See e.g., Vicki
Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 473, 497-98 & n. 125 (discussing "structural" arguments for the inalienability of constitutional
rights that relate to effects on society, governance, or third parties); Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1323, 1335-36 (2000) (discussing "non-instrumentalist" and "instrumentalist" rationales for making votes
inalienable, and identifying the latter with Cass Sunstein's argument that the alienability of votes would change
the meaning of voting) (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 964-65
(1996)).
30
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transfer itself, but by inducing better pre-blockade decisions.33 Seeing a
blockade ahead will influence A's decision to acquire the entitlement.
Sometimes, these ex ante effects relate closely to features intrinsic to the
good. For example, Titmuss's argument that markets in blood would alter
incentives to engage in altruistic donation amounts to an upstream effect on
individual "harvesting" choices that seems to turn on something intrinsic to
the good in question.34 Often, however, ex ante rationales for inalienability
are tied to extrinsic considerations such as efficiency or distributive
fairness, which might also be pursued in other ways.35
Similarly, ex post and intrinsic concerns share an affinity in the
literature, even though they are not conceptually coterminous. Concerns
about the intrinsic wrongness of transferring certain items feed naturally
(although not exclusively) into concerns about the ex post effects the
transfer itself will have on the parties, on the entitlement, and on society.
Because ex post effects are often context-specific in just the way that
intrinsic rationales demand, the two are frequently (although not
inevitably)36 paired. Together, intrinsic and ex post arguments make up the
bulk of scholarship about inalienability. This paper, in contrast, focuses on
a different and often overlooked subset of alienability concerns: the area
defined by the overlap of ex ante and extrinsic concerns. Thus, I focus on
inalienability's impact on ex ante incentives to acquire and use goods that
are not deemed intrinsically unsuited for market transfer. To get an intuitive
sense of this category, it is helpful to consider a few examples of goods that
I will call "anxiously alienable."
B. Anxiously Alienable Goods
The following nonexhaustive list offers some concrete examples of
anxiously alienable goods. Although these goods are generally accepted as
appropriate articles of commerce,37 their transfer ignites concern under
33
A corollary of this point is that the blockade itself may appear inefficient when viewed ex post. See infra
Part III.B.
34
TITMUSS, supra note 28, at 223.
35
Sometimes supply effects that are straightforwardly produced by market forces take on negative normative
valences as a result of an entitlement's special characteristics. For example, babies or donor organs might be
produced in larger quantities or in different output patterns as a result of market forces—results that might be
viewed as fundamentally at odds with the meaning of parental rights or organ donation. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel
and Frances H. Miller, The Inapplicability of Market Theory to Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 99, 101-02 (1987). At
least in theory, these supply effects could be controlled by means other than inalienability (e.g., production
quotas), making the concern "extrinsic" in my schema. Similarly, the concern that people would engage in
violence or oppression to harvest organs or produce babies is as "extrinsic" in that these acts could, in theory, be
controlled independent of alienability restraints. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. However, features
intrinsic to the entitlements at issue contribute to the horrific nature of these acts.
36
For example, Michael Heller's discussion of legal rules against entitlement fragmentation (an extrinsically
based inalienability rule) focuses on the ex post effect of these rules on future marketability. See Heller, supra
note 2, at 1176-82.
37
I do not mean to suggest that there could never be an intrinsic argument relating to the alienability of the
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certain conditions due to feared ex ante incentive effects on acquisition or
use. That concern, interestingly, does not always translate into restrictions
on alienability; thus, the legal treatment of the items on the list varies. Each
of these examples has received extensive treatment by other authors which I
do not attempt to summarize here; my brief descriptions are instead
designed to point to commonalities (and some differences) among the cases.
1. Patents
Patent holders may license their patents to others rather than develop
marketable goods and services themselves. While this power to license is
not usually deemed problematic, some patent holders who seek licensing
arrangements are tagged as "trolls."38 Although definitions vary, concerns
focus on entities that strategically acquire a patent for the express purpose
of later licensing it (that is, with no plan to practice it), then lie in wait as
other business entities develop products or services for which the patented
material is an integral part.39 Once reliance on the patented element has
reached a very high level (for example, the production of millions of
"BlackBerry" handheld PDAs) the troll emerges and threatens a devastating
shutdown through injunctive relief unless a licensing agreement is
negotiated.40 The degree of monopoly power enjoyed by the patent holder
is obviously great at this stage.41
Concern over such "trolls" (although not denominated as such) is
evident in Justice Kennedy's concurrence in eBay v. MercExchange, a case
goods on this list. See, e.g., Steven Cherensky, A Penny for Their Thoughts: Employee-Inventors, Preinvention
Assignment Agreements, Property, and Personhood, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 595 (1993) (discussing a personhood
argument against preinvention agreements that assign patent rights to the employer).
38
The term has been attributed to Peter Detkin, who coined it in 2001 when he was a lawyer at Intel.
HELLER, GRIDLOCK, supra note 18, at 218-19 n.34. According to Detkin, patent trolls "try to make a lot of
money off a patent that they are not practicing and have no intention of practicing and in most cases never
practiced." Id.
39
See, e.g., Douglas Gary Lichtman, Patent Holdouts and the Standard-Setting Process, Academic Advisory
Council Bulletin 1.3, Progress & Freedom Foundation 4 (May 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=902646; Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2008-10 (2007). Firms are typically described as trolls only when they do not make any
products of their own; firms that make products may also hold patent rights essential to others, but their strategic
posturing is constrained by their own need to use components patented by others. See HELLER, GRIDLOCK, supra
note 18, at 59 (noting that the system of "mutually assured destruction" that constrains "equally balanced
competitors" does not deter patent trolls).
40
See, e.g., Lichtman, supra note 39; Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 39. The threatened shutdown of
BlackBerry service was averted by a $6.125 million settlement reached shortly before a judge was expected to
issue an injunction. See Ian Austen, BlackBerry Service to Continue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2006.
41
Although all patents grant a limited monopoly, the degree of leverage this confers against another party
depends on questions of both remedies and substitutes. As the infringer moves further along the path to
production, viable substitutes dwindle; the company, through its investments, becomes increasingly committed to
one manner of proceeding. See Lichtman, supra note 39, at 2. By analogy, all land is unique and hence each
landowner holds a monopoly over a specific location, but this only produces significant monopoly power in fairly
limited circumstances—as where the land is uniquely well-suited to some particular purpose, or is part of a larger
assembly, as for a railroad or highway. Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
61, 75-75 (1986).
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holding that a four-factor test, not an automatic presumption, determines
whether a patent holder is entitled to injunctive relief.42 On remand, the
district court declined to grant an injunction, finding that "MercExchange
has utilized its patents as a sword to extract money rather than as a shield to
protect its right to exclude or its market-share, reputation, goodwill, or
name recognition."43 The ability to use things that one owns "to extract
money" is of course the essence of alienability.
2. Domain Names
A practice known as "cybersquatting" developed from the acquisition
structure for internet domain names.44 Cybersquatters are those who
strategically acquire domain names closely associated with well-known
companies or individuals, only to then attempt to resell those names to those
companies or individuals for a profit.45 Congress responded with the 1999
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA),46 which provided
remedies against domain name owners found to have “a bad faith intent to
profit from” a protected mark.47 ACPA's multi-factor test for bad faith
includes (but is not limited to) nine enumerated factors, subject to a safe
harbor.48 Factors weighing against a finding of bad faith include the
domain registerer’s own intellectual property rights in the name, the fact
that the domain name is the registerer’s own legal name or other commonly
used name, and the fact that the domain name had already been used by the
registerer for bona fide purposes.49 Factors suggesting an intent to harm the
42

eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy J., concurring); see e.g.., John M. Golden,
"Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2113 (2007); Balganesh, supra note 3, at 655.
43
eBay v. MercExchange, 500 F.Supp. 2d 556, 571 (E.D. Va. 2007).
44
The system of domain name registration permits anyone to pay a nominal fee and claim a website address,
on a relatively unrestricted first-come, first-serve basis. See, e.g., Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.net, 302
F.3d 248, 252 (4th Cir. 2002) ("A person seeking the right to use a particular domain name may register with one
of a number of registrar organizations that assign domain names on a first-come first-served basis."); Anupam
Chander, The New, New Property, 81 TEX. L. REV. 715 (2003) (discussing and criticizing the "first-come, firstserve" system of domain name rights). Federal statutes place some limits on domain name registration and use,
however. See infra notes 46-47. A great deal has been written about cybersquatting and related phenomena;
some treatments that connect the topic to larger property theory and mechanism design questions include Gideon
Parchomovsky, Trademarks, Domain Names, and Internal Auctions, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 211; Lewinsohn-Zamir,
supra note 22, at 693-94; Chander, supra.
45
See Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 238 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2001) describing this
problem); Sporty’s Farm, L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Market, Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 2000).
46
Pub. L. No. 10-113, 113 State. 1536 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)).
47
Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d); see Virtual Works, 238 F.3d (describing the statutory scheme). Rules
promulgated by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) as part of its dispute
resolution policies also focus on bad faith. See Parchomovsky, supra note 44, at 213;
http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm. Further limits on domain name registration for those
displaying materials that are obscene or "harmful to minors" are found in the Truth in Domain Names Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21 521, 117 Stat. 686 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. 2252B). See generally Christopher G.
Clark, The Truth in Domain Names Act of 2003 and a Preventative Measure to Combat Typosquatting, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 1476 (2004).
48
15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) & (ii).
49
Id. at (B)(i) (I), (II), (III), & (IV).
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holder of the protected mark or to extract money from the protected-mark
holder would weigh in the opposite direction.50 In some circumstances, an
offer to sell the name is deemed indicative of bad faith.51
3. Land Use Entitlements
The possibility that injunctions will be used to exert undue leverage,
already mentioned in the patent context, emerges again in the realm of land
use entitlements.52 Consider the case of Pile v. Pedrick, in which one party
built a wall with foundation stones that encroached trivially on the other
party's property.53 Refusing damages, and further refusing to allow the
other party to file off the ends of the offending stones (which would require
entry onto the plaintiff's land), the plaintiff insisted on an injunction that
would require complete destruction of the wall and the building to which it
was attached. Presumably, the motive for taking this extreme position was
either spite or the desire to extract larger damages than the law prescribed.54
The law often resorts to liability rules to address such innocent
encroachments. Either the encroacher is permitted to remain on the land by
paying fair market value for it, or (in the case of larger encroachments
falling under the "innocent improver" doctrine) the landowner is entitled to
the property only upon payment of fair market value for the
improvements.55 Both approaches place the land and the improvement in
the same hands without the need for mutual consent, and hence avoid
strategic posturing. However, there may be some situations where an
injunction issues that, if enforced, would be inefficient. To deter parties
from insisting on injunctions solely to gain bargaining leverage, Ian Ayres
and Kristen Madison have proposed an alienability limit—a default rule
specifying that the plaintiff may not sell her injunction to the defendant—
coupled with procedures that would allow the defendant to voluntarily
increase the amount of damages that will be awarded.56 This procedure
50

See id. at (V), (VI), & (VIII).
Id. at (VI).
52
The empirical picture is less clear. Ward Farnsworth's examination of twenty nuisance cases did not
reveal any instances of post-judgment bargaining, nor any indication that such bargaining would have occurred
had the cases been decided differently. Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment?
A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 381-84 (1999).
53
31 A. 646 (Pa. 1895).
54
See Ayres & Madison, supra note 2, at 49-50 (analyzing Pile and the strategic potential of the plaintiff's
remedial choice).
55
See, e.g., THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 54-56, 68-77
(2007) (discussing these remedial approaches, which depart from the common law's harsh injunctive treatment of
even the most minimal and innocent encroachments). Although these forms of relief represent the modern trend,
their availability varies by jurisdiction and is restricted in various ways. See id.; JESSE DUKEMINIER, ET AL.,
PROPERTY 135 (6th ed. 2006) (noting "[t]he modern tendency . . . to ease the plight of innocent improvers”).
56
Ayres & Madison, supra note 2. The alienability limit would only bar plaintiff-to-defendant sales; the
winning plaintiff could sell her injunction to third parties if she wished. Id. at 71-72. The alienability limit would
serve only as a default rule; the parties together or the defendant acting alone can opt for full alienability. Id. at
51
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would put the plaintiff to a forced, final choice between damages (as
augmented by the defendant) and an injunction that cannot be lifted in
exchange for compensation.57
The bargaining dilemma that Ayres and Madison identify is not limited
to injunctions. Coase pointed out a converse problem with the strategic
exercise of land use rights that lie within an owner's discretion (and that are
therefore not enjoinable):
A threatens to build a house which will spoil the view
from, and block the light to, B’s house. . . . A demands
£1,000 as the price of agreeing not to build . . . . Is this
blackmail? Suppose that A would not have built, whether B
made this payment or not, because the cost of building a
house on this site exceeded the price at which it could be
sold. In these circumstances, the demand for £1,000 could
be regarded as blackmail or something akin to it. It is a
payment to A for agreeing not to do something which he has
no interest in doing.58
Many similar problems of the "pay me not to" (or "pay me to stop")
variety can be readily imagined, from ugly structures to jarring noises.
4. Damaging Information
Whether inadvertently or through "digging," a party may acquire
information about a person that, if disclosed, would be highly damaging to
that person's reputation, profession, or relationships. It is perfectly legal to
disclose that information oneself or to sell it to third parties, such as
tabloids, who will disclose it. It is also perfectly legal to keep the
information to oneself. But offering to sell the suppression of the
information to the person who would be harmed by its disclosure is a
serious crime, blackmail. This is thought to present a puzzle or paradox.59
Why is it a crime to offer a person whose fate turns on the release or
98-100.
57
Id. at 100 ("Inalienability and additur in effect give defendants the right to make a take-it-or-leave-it
offer.").
58
Ronald H. Coase, The 1987 McCorkle Lecture: Blackmail, 74 VA. L. REV. 655, 670 (1988); see ROBERT
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 84-85 (1974) (presenting a similar example in which a "neighbor has no
desire to erect the [ugly] structure on the land; he formulates his plan and informs you of it solely in order to sell
you his abstention from it").
59
The scholarly literature on blackmail is unusually rich. See, e.g., Coase, supra note 58, at 671; James
Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 670 (1984); Mitchell N. Berman, The
Evidentiary Theory of Blackmail: Taking Motives Seriously, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 795 (1998); Nozick, supra note
58, at 85-86; Richard A. Epstein, Blackmail, Inc., 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 553 (1983); Symposium, Blackmail, 141 U.
PA. L. REV. 1565 (1993); JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, VOLUME 4: HARMLESS
WRONGDOING 238-76 (1988). The text sets out the basic puzzle with which most authors begin their analyses.
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suppression of the information the chance to influence, through a monetary
payment, which of two (entirely legal) options one will pursue? Damaging
information, generally alienable, somehow becomes a forbidden item of
commerce when offered to the one person we might expect to be most
interested in what happens to it.
5. Water
In Western states where water is scarce, a rule of prior appropriation
allocates rights based on diversion for beneficial use.60 Water rights are
transferable, subject to limitations, but buying rights for speculative
purposes is prohibited.61 Typically, this prohibition is enforced through
beneficial use requirements that do not permit holding water for future
use.62 If one fails to make beneficial use of water for a period of time,
rights to it can be lost.63 One may only transfer rights in water that has been
put to beneficial use, and the buyer must continue with beneficial use in
order to maintain the rights.64 These restrictions are apparently driven by
concerns that speculative appropriators could monopolize the water supply,
causing prices to spike upward in a way that could threaten livelihoods and
even lives.65 Other restrictions on transfers, such as requiring that the buyer
be located in the same stream basin and make the same use of the water,
may be understood as responses to measurement difficulties in allocating
use rights.66
In Eastern states, where water has generally been more plentiful, a
riparian system bundles the rights in surface water with the ownership of
property abutting the water source, precluding the a la carte alienation of
water rights.67 Reasonable use limitations, coupled with distinctions like
those between "natural" and "artificial" uses, further prevent water from
60
See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 55, at 34-35; see also Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The
Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 445, 455 (2008) (noting that "in many states, prior
appropriation has acquired a regulatory overlay").
61
See, e.g., Sandra Zellmer, The Anti-Speculation Doctrine and Its Implications for Collaborative Water
Management, NEVADA L. REV. (forthcoming), draft at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1121961; Janet C. Neuman,
Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency on Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L.
919 (1998).
62
See Zellmer, supra note 61, at 12-13; Neuman at 964. Sometimes there are outright prohibitions on
speculation. See, e.g., Zellmer, supra note 61, at 13 n. 73 (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. 37-92-305(9)(b)). There are a
number of exceptions to this rule. See id. at 21-31. For example, states and local governments can hold water for
future use. See id. at 21-24; Neuman, supra, at 968.
63
See, e.g., Zellmer at 12-13; Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 22, at 655-66; Smith, supra note 60, at 468;
John C. Peck & Constance Crittenden Owen, Loss of Kansas Water Rights for Non-Use, 43 KAN. L. REV. 801
(1995). For a discussion of the distinction between abandonment and forfeiture, see Peck & Owen, supra, at 820.
64
Zellmer, supra note 61, at 20-21.
65
See e.g., Zellmer, supra note 61, at 15-16.
66
See Dean Lueck & Thomas Miceli, Property Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 183, 246-47
(A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, eds., 2007); YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS 119-21 (2d. ed., 1997).
67
See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 2, at 979-82.
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being extracted from the stream for resale.68 Although groundwater is
handled through a separate regulatory system, alienability may raise
concern in that context as well.69 For example, a Vermont businessman's
recent plan to withdraw 250,000 bottles of water each day from an East
Montpelier spring has attracted opposition from neighbors.70 Analogous
concerns about excessive draws against a common pool explain both the
recently-enacted Great Lakes Compact, which largely prohibits diversion of
water from the Great Lakes basin, and continuing ire against the compact's
"bottled-water loophole."71
6. Scarce Seats
Legal limits and social opprobrium often attach to so-called "ticket
scalpers" who buy tickets to popular events solely for the purpose of
reselling them later at a higher price.72 Related concerns surround the resale
of access to other scarce goods, such as preferred airline seats73 or tables at
restaurants.74 In such cases, the party offering the good or service has set
the price below the market-clearing level,75 producing queuing (and in the
restaurant case, bribes). As a result, there are arbitrage opportunities for an
intermediary. The fact that the underlying good is openly sold suggests that
the concern stems from the intermediation itself rather than from a
conviction that the good in question is intrinsically unsuited for sale.76

68

See, e.g., id.; Smith, supra note 60, at 473.
See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 55, at 34 (discussing the historical and modern treatment of
groundwater).
70
See Felicity Barringer, Bottling Plan Pushes Groundwater to Center Stage in Vermont, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
21, 2008.
71
See Susan Saulny, Congress Passes Great Lakes Protection Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2008, A14 (noting
that diversion exceptions are limited and would require approval from all eight states bordering the lakes); Kari
Lyndersen, Bottled Water at Issue in Great Lakes, Sept. 29, 2008, A07 (discussing controversy over the compact's
exception for water in containers with capacities of 5.7 gallons or less).
72
See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 59, at 231-38; see also text accompanying notes 146-149, infra.
73
See Ron Lieber & Susan Warren, Southwest Makes It Harder to Jump the Line --- Airline Tries to Shut
Down Web Sites That Help Fliers Beat Stampede for Good Seats, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2006.
74
See, e.g., Monica Eng & Christopher Borrelli, Your Table Is Ready—For a Price, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 8,
2008, at 1 (discussing the online service, tablexchange.com, which sells reservations to overbooked restaurants).
75
But see Pascal Courty, Some Economics of Ticket Resale, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 85, 85 (2003) (questioning
the underpricing hypothesis).
76
It is possible to quibble with this point. Consider a case that is a bit harder to classify—the practice of law
students attempting to buy their way into oversubscribed classes. See Martha Neil, NYU Students Seek Coveted
Law School Classes, Will Pay Cash, ABA JOURNAL, July 28, 2008, available at
http://www.abajournal.com/weekly/nyu_students_seek_coveted_law_school_classes_will_pay_cash. Here, the
underlying good (a legal education) is the subject of a market transaction, albeit one that only a limited number of
people are invited to engage in. Once one's tuition is paid and one becomes a member of a law school community,
however, access to different portions of the educational experience may be rationed on non-monetary bases for
reasons intrinsic to the meaning of the community and its collective endeavor. See Levmore, supra note 7, at 12021. One might try to make a similar argument about, say, the community of people who are taking a particular
Southwest Airlines flight—that seats are allocated among them on a non-monetary basis for reasons intrinsic to
the Southwest flying experience.
69
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C. Middlepeople and Monopolists
Nearly all of the cases above involve intermediaries or "middlemen"
whose decision to acquire the entitlement is entirely a function of its
alienability. In the remaining examples (such as those involving land use
rights), alienability creates an incentive to use or enforce an existing
entitlement that would not otherwise be used or enforced. In many of these
cases, the incentive is enhanced by the chance of wielding significant
monopoly power. If the entitlements in question were inalienable, certain
acquisitions and threatened uses would drop out of the picture. Foreseeing
the inability to sell, those motivated solely by resale opportunities would
simply select out of the market. Inalienability, then, could serve as a tool to
change the mix of acquisition and use decisions associated with a given
entitlement.
Of course, the fact that inalienability could be used in this way does not
establish that it should be. The fact that strategic acquisition for resale can
produce anxiety does not dictate any particular response, and one might
well question whether restricting alienability could ever be the right answer.
Driving out transactions is usually a bad idea—although consumers may
dislike middlepeople for skimming away surplus, such intermediaries
typically add value to the market as a whole by lowering search costs,
absorbing risk, thickening markets, and spanning time and space to match
up consumers with products and services.77 Notwithstanding the anxiety
that "speculators" and other intermediaries have produced throughout
history,78 as a rule they appear to make markets work better.79 Is there
anything about anxiously alienable goods (or some subset of them) that
might cast doubt on this general principle?
One way to approach the question is to observe that some transactions
(or threatened transactions) are so fraught with fairness or efficiency
concerns that the question is not whether the law will become involved, but
how. If policymakers decide that a particular set of transactions leads to
unacceptably high bargaining costs or to other normatively unacceptable
outcomes, an intervention of some sort is inevitable—whether it takes the
77

See, e.g., DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY, THE APPLIED THEORY OF PRICE 216-24 (1982)
See, e.g., id. at 216 (citing CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF
FINANCIAL CRISES 39-40 (1978)); Lynn Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering
in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 712-34 (1999) (discussing legal limits on speculation and
some possible rationales for them).
79
In financial markets, speculative activity is credited with helping to generate more information and
liquidity, among other benefits. For a recent discussion of these points in the context of the SEC's (now repealed)
ban on short-selling, see Menachem Brenner & Marti G. Subrahmanyam, End the Ban on Short-Selling,
FORBES.COM, Oct. 1, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/2008/09/30/short-selling-ban-oped-cx_mb_1001brenner.html;
see also Kara Scannell & Craig Karmin, Short-Sale Ban Ends to Poor Reviews, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2008. For
discussion of the benefits associated with land speculation, see, e.g., Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 22, at 694;
Epstein, supra note 2, at 989.
78
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form of reviewing particular transactions and applying punishments if
indicia of "bad faith" are found, substituting liability rules for property
rules, altering acquisition protocols, or something else. Because all of these
possible responses will cost something, it makes sense to compare the costs
of inalienability with those of the other alternatives. An examination of the
potential fairness and efficiency concerns implicated by anxiously alienable
goods indicates why the law might get involved and provides a preliminary
sense of whether inalienability might offer a viable avenue for that
involvement.
1. Fairness Concerns
Perceptions of unfairness, perhaps augmented by cognitive biases, offer
important explanations for the concern that attaches to anxiously alienable
goods. While in many settings involving inalienable entitlements,
distributive concerns focus on protecting would-be sellers from exploitation
by would-be buyers (think, for example, of the sales of organs or votes),
concerns about exploitation run in the other direction in the case of
anxiously alienable goods. Here, sympathies lie with the would-be buyer,
while the would-be seller is regarded with suspicion. Three factors seem
especially important in this connection.
First, people may perceive unfairness whenever the owner of a good has
sufficient leverage to raise prices above competitive or accustomed levels.
For example, one study found that 82% of respondents viewed it as either
"unfair" or "very unfair" for a merchant to raise the price of snow shovels
after a snowstorm.80 The snowstorm may be extensive enough to give a
merchant a temporary geographic monopoly—if people cannot move their
cars without buying a shovel, they can only buy from a store within walking
distance—and the leveraging of this market power may be viewed as
unfairly exploiting a vulnerability. On the other hand, the potential for such
a price boost may have created the incentive for the merchant to stock the
shovels in the first place, allowing them to take up floor space and overhead
during the many non-snowy days preceding the storm.81 Moreover, the
higher price arguably does a better job than queues or mob scenes at
efficiently moving the newly scarce resources to their highest valuing
users.82 Yet perceptions of unfairness remain, perhaps because of the
80
Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on Profit-Seeking:
Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 729 (1986) cited and discussed in MICHAEL TREBILCOCK,
THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 89-90 (1993).
81
Discussion of these points recently resurfaced surrounding preparations for Tropical Storm Fay. See, e.g.,
Posting of Ilya Somin to The Volokh Conspiracy, In Defense of Price Gouging,
http://volokh.com/posts/1219175029.shtml (August 19, 2008).
82
See TREBILCOCK, supra note 80, at 89 (noting that in this scenario, "the price mechanism is being invoked
to ration goods in temporary short-supply among an excess of demanders").
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tendency to focus on the price at which the shovels were available before
the storm.83 Similar effects may generate distaste for ticket scalpers or
reservation merchants.
Second, and closely related, equity concerns are likely to be heightened
when the good in question is necessary to forestall a loss. Losses, of course,
are a function of baselines, and hence a matter of framing.84 However,
some goods, like water, are so essential to life that lack of them would be
unambiguously viewed as a loss by everyone.85 Likewise, the inability to
control an entitlement that is tightly associated with one's identity (even if
someone else is the legal owner) could threaten especially painful losses—a
factor that could be relevant for some anxiously alienable goods, such as
domain names or damaging information.86 Even the lowly snow shovel is
necessary to keep people from experiencing a loss relative to ordinary
days—being snowbound.87 Similar losses are easy to see in the enforcement
of an injunction that will disrupt a going concern, the building of an ugly
structure, and so on.
Third, the resale of entitlements that are not allocated through market
processes or that are initially sold below the market-clearing price may
contribute to a perception of unfairness. A review of the list above reveals
that anxiously alienable goods tend to fit this description. If the initial
allocation of the good did not screen for high valuation, it is likely both that
the initial holder of the entitlement will not be its highest valuer and that a
large amount of surplus will result from moving the entitlement into the
hands of that high valuer. To allow an intermediary who initially acquires
and then resells the entitlement to claim a significant share of this surplus
may seem to grant her an unearned windfall.88
Sometimes, however, the seller acquired the good through some past
effort, as in the case of patents, or on the basis of some value added, such as
contributing liquidity or special knowledge. Here, the picture is less clear,
even from a purely distributive perspective. We might wish to reward
83
Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 80, at 729-31 (discussing the role of "reference transactions" in
fairness evaluations).
84
See id. at 731-32.
85
See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 59, at 232 (distinguishing ticket scalping from charging a high price for
water to a person dying of thirst); TREBILCOCK, supra note 80, at 84-101 (distinguishing situations based on
whether they pose a threat to life).
86
I thank Daria Roithmayr for comments on this point. For an extended examination of the distributive
implications of domain name policy, see generally Chander, supra note 44.
87
Alternatively, the price increase for the shovel might be the loss in the story. If prices had been at "storm
levels" all along (even with very frequent "sales"), the reaction would likely be much different. See Kahneman,
Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 80, at 732 (71% of subjects viewed as unfair a car dealer's $200 price increase in
response to the shortage of a popular car model, while only 42% thought it unfair for a dealer who had previously
offered a $200 "discount" for the car to revert to the car's list price in these circumstances).
88
But see Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1505-10 (1999) (arguing that what appears to be a
"windfall" is often the result of planning and effort). In these cases, the initial amount paid may serve as a
"reference transaction" that influences the evaluation of the resale's fairness. See Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler,
supra note 80, at 729-31.
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creative work and other useful efforts by granting control over at least some
portion of the surplus that results. But what if part of the surplus on the
table is generated not by those efforts alone but by an idiosyncratically
vulnerable position that another party comes to occupy? An analogous
question arises with respect to a landowner's right to a share of the surplus
that comes from combining her property with that of others, where that
surplus comes not from anything that the landowner has done but rather
from a larger project conceived by someone else.89
These fairness points may seem too cognitively malleable or
normatively indeterminate to offer much help in understanding, much less
addressing, anxiety about alienability. But inalienability's capacity to filter
out particular transactions (and transactors), if otherwise justified on
efficiency grounds, could have the side benefit of reducing unfairness
perceptions—and potentially doing so in a manner that is less costly than
other possible policy reactions.
2. Inefficiencies
A paradigmatic source of inefficiency is the costly wrangling associated
with bilateral monopoly.90 Land use disputes between neighbors, blackmail,
and some of the other scenarios discussed above introduce exactly this
concern—the good, offered by a single seller, has an idiosyncratically high
value for a single buyer while remaining worthless, or very nearly so, to
everyone else. The risk of bargaining impasse or wasteful negotiation is
quite high in such cases, especially when the surplus at issue is very large.
Significantly, the efficiency analysis is indifferent to how the available
surplus gets distributed between the parties, except insofar as distribution
feeds back into ex ante incentives to engage in productive activities or
affects the efficiency of the bargaining process itself.91 The fear is not that
one party will "take advantage" of another or get more surplus than they
"deserve," but rather that worthwhile deals will fail altogether, or will
happen only after much value is dissipated through costly strategic
interactions.
Such bargaining concerns have received a great deal of attention in the
literature comparing property rules and liability rules. In many instances,
society may view the costs of wrangling and the risk of impasse as the price
it must pay to maintain a system that gives parties appropriate incentives to
create unique things of value, to acquire and use special skills, and so on.
89

See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 41, at 86.
See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Monsanto Lecture: Protecting Property With Puts, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 793, 802-04
(1998) (describing bilateral monopoly bargaining problems).
91
See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and
Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1077-78 (1980).
90
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But suppose we could be certain that the acquisition or use that created the
bilateral monopoly added no social value. In that case, the wrangling
associated with the resulting bargaining games would produce only a loss.92
A mechanism for filtering out these kinds of transactions—worthless
intermediations that introduce bargaining dilemmas without any
countervailing social benefits—would seem welcome from an efficiency
standpoint.
Those analyzing phenomena like blackmail and cybersquatting have
correctly homed in on the worthlessness of the underlying acquisition
activity.93 But worthlessness is a slippery benchmark; as Russell Hardin
notes, all of us do lots of things that fail to generate any social product.94
For the most part, however, people internalize the costs of doing
(apparently) pointless things, which provides a strong incentive not to
engage in them unless their consumption value or some hidden benefit for
others makes them worth their opportunity costs. Thus, the market generally
drives out truly worthless intermediation. But if the meddler can leverage
her worthless intervention into significant monopoly power, her ability to
offload costs onto a hapless victim keeps the essential worthlessness of the
intervention from operating as a check. That same monopoly leverage then
gives rise to high bargaining costs. In such cases, inducing parties to select
out of the marketplace through alienability limits might avoid costly
bargaining problems relatively cheaply; although some transactions would
be blocked, they would be transactions that add no value.
How well do our problem cases above align with this model? Buying
domain names for resale seems to line up reasonably well, assuming (as
seems true) that the intermediaries' involvement plays no role in sustaining
or funding the system for making domain names available. Damaging
information fits well up to a point, but then hits a snag. Sometimes the
information that is uncovered holds market value, keeping the
intermediary's involvement from being completely useless.95 The model
92
Cf. Coase, supra note 58, at 671 ("It is obviously undesirable that resources should be devoted to
bargaining which produces a situation no better than it was previously.").
93
See, e.g., Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 22, at 684 (distinguishing cybersquatting from land speculation on
the grounds that the former "is a socially wasteful activity"); Coase, supra note 58, at 671 ("It is obviously
undesirable that resources should be devoted to bargaining which produces a situation no better than it was
previously."); Douglas H. Ginsburg & Paul Schechtman, Blackmail: An Economic Analysis of the Law, 141 U.
PA. L. REV. 1849, 1860 (1993) ("No rational economic planner would tolerate the existence of an industry
dedicated to digging up dirt, at real resource cost, and then reburying it.") (footnote omitted); NOZICK, supra note
58, at 84-85 (contrasting a case in which a neighbor has a legitimate desire to build a "monstrosity," where paying
him not to do so "will be a productive exchange," with the unproductive exchange that would follow if the
neighbor came up with the building plan "solely in order to sell you his abstention from it"). But see Joseph
Isenbergh, Blackmail From A to C, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1905, 1919-21 (1993) (questioning whether the bargaining
in blackmail situations can really be classified as unproductive, given the realignment of property rights it
potentially produces).
94
Russell Hardin, Blackmailing for Mutual Good, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1806 (1993).
95
See text accompanying notes 251-255, infra (discussing "market-price" blackmail). In the case of
incriminating information, it might be argued that the intermediation of blackmailers serves an additional
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arguably fits even less comfortably with patents; monopoly power may
exist, but as long as "trolls" add some value, there is not the kind of
worthless meddling that the pattern calls for.96 Of course, it is not necessary
that a class of transactions be utterly valueless in order for filtering them out
to be the best thing, on balance. The question depends not only on the value
of the transactions but also on the costs of the bargaining situations they
create and the costs of alternative ways of addressing those bargaining
situations. Bringing inalienability explicitly into the picture permits just
such a comparison. It may also be possible, as discussed below, to adjust
alienability in ways that selectively flush out relatively worthless
intermediations while leaving incentives unchanged for the relatively
valuable ones.97
Land use presents a somewhat different picture than the other scenarios,
in that parties are faulted for threatening to use or enforce an existing right,
rather than for acquiring a right anew for leverage purposes.98 Although it is
often assumed that the threatened use or enforcement of a right that one
would not independently find valuable is a social waste, this might not
always be true.99 For example, a landowner's threat to build an ugly
structure or a tall fence might convey information to her neighbor about the
extent of their respective land use packages. This new knowledge is not
completely worthless if it leads the neighbor to consider bargaining to a
different rights allocation. Such a bargain could lead to a new servitude on
the threatening owner's land that would prevent a future owner, who might
genuinely wish to build some unsightly structure, from carrying out that
plan.100 More broadly, the possibility of such threats may lead to useful
societal arrangements—such as reciprocal covenants that restrain each
landowner from undertaking actions like the building of ugly fences.101
Still, it is worth asking whether the improvement in rights definition that
flows from the builder's threat carries a large enough social benefit to justify
the resulting bargaining costs.
The last two examples in the list—water and scarce seats—diverge from
the pattern in other ways. Water speculators and ticket scalpers do not (at
purpose—private deterrence—although countervailing factors may make blackmail socially costly on net. See
Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Blackmail as Private Justice, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1935 (1993).
96
For arguments discussing the value added by trolls, see, e.g., James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the
Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189
(2006).
97
See infra Part III.C.2.
98
We might think of an injunction as an entitlement that might be intentionally acquired for leverage
purposes. But if strong exclusion rights are part of what the landowner holds, the injunction arguably involves
only the enforcement of an existing entitlement rather than the acquisition of a new one.
99
See Isenbergh, supra note 93, at 1919-23 (observing that land use bargains that appear to leave things
unchanged may actually result in a useful realignment of property rights "beneath the surface").
100
See id.
101
However, to the extent these new rights allocations are hard to alter, new problems may be presented.
See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communities, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 829, 855-64.
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least typically) introduce the prospect of bilateral monopoly.102 There are
multiple units of the good in question, multiple potential buyers, and likely
multiple sellers as well—the prospect of two parties wastefully vying over a
large amount of surplus seems remote, and the worthlessness of the
intermediation is at least open to question. Nonetheless, if one party were
to gain a monopoly position over the resource, the usual deadweight loss
might result in which some customers who would be willing to pay the
competitive price no longer purchase the good.103
A different sort of problem arises when the party who is willing to pay
the most for the entitlement presents a threat to a common pool resource or
public good. Thinking again about ex ante effects, an inalienability rule
might induce self-selection by those who will be good contributors. If
people who are willing to engage in a given acquisition protocol, whether
standing in a line for tickets or farming the land for a number of years, also
happen to be good contributors to a public good (e.g., an enthusiastic
audience or the successful settlement of the West) then prohibiting resale
will be necessary to make that self-selection work.104
Similarly, erasing the prospect of resales would reduce the incentive to
"stockpile" entitlements in an effort to command monopoly power. Because
the viability of some common pool resources depends on faith that others
will not threaten the good's continued availability through stockpiling,
getting stockpilers to self-select out of the commons could have important
effects.105 At a more basic level, the draws that commoners will make
against common pool resources will be more modest if they are drawing
only for their own use, rather than for resale.106 This analysis has obvious
relevance to rights in water and other natural resources, and is best taken up
in the next Part's examination of alienability restrictions as potential
responses to the strategic dilemmas associated with the commons and the
anticommons.
II. INALIENABILITY AS TRAGEDY MANAGEMENT
In this Part, I will examine more broadly the role that alienability limits
could play in managing collective action problems surrounding resources.
My goal at this stage is not to argue that inalienability rules are superior to
102
Scenarios like the one in which person a dying of thirst encounters the only water source within reach
would be exceptions. See JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, VOL. 3: HARM TO SELF
250 (1984) (discussing this example, posed in Jeffrie G. Murphy, Consent, Coercion, and Hard Choices, 67 VA.
L. REV. 67, 88-89 (1981)).
103
See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Market Power and Secondary-Line Differential Pricing, 71 GEO. L.J.
1157, 1162-64 (1983).
104
See infra notes 146-150 and accompanying text (discussing these examples and citing past work on
them).
105
See text accompanying note 127, infra.
106
See infra notes 117-120 and accompanying text.
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other interventions; often, they are not.107 Rather, I hope to show how
adjustments to alienability can serve as complements to and substitutes for
other adjustments to the property bundle, such as the use of liability rules in
place of property rules. The examples discussed in this section thus show
how inalienability could play a role in increasing the available surplus
within various collective settings, whether private or public. Of course, it is
an entirely separate question, not reached here, whether the government
should expend resources to facilitate the realization of that surplus,
especially in instances where it will redound to the benefit of a small group
or private entity rather than to the public at large.
First a definitional point: While inalienability can be construed quite
broadly to include any restriction that has either the purpose or effect of
making transfers more difficult or unlikely,108 it is helpful to distinguish
legal constraints on the transfer of property ("alienability limits" or
"inalienability rules")109 from other conditions, restrictions, or features that
limit, as a practical matter, the seller's prospects for alienating the property
("marketability").110 The former category includes not only outright bans on
transfers, but also transfer taxes or fees, procedures that must be completed
prior to sale, criteria that transferors or transferees must meet (such as age
restrictions or minimum holding periods), limits on the permissible price
range, requirements that items be sold as a bundle (or separately),111 limits
on the times at which transfers may occur, and so on.112 In the latter
category we might place servitudes attaching to real or personal property
107

Later, I take up the question of when inalienability rules might be preferred. See infra Part III.
See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 931 ("Inalienability can be defined as any restriction on the
transferability, ownership, or use of an entitlement").
109
These constraints might be imposed by law or by private entities.
110
See, e.g., Heller, supra note 2, at 1200 (distinguishing alienability from marketability in a slightly
different manner); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, REAL PROPERTY 474 (1984) (distinguishing "free alienability," which in his
lexicon "means that a landowner can in disposing of his lands impose whatever conditions he wishes for as long
as he wishes," with "[f]ree marketability," which goes to whether a property interest is "readily saleable"). The
distinction tracks one that has been made in property law between restraints on the alienation of a fee simple
absolute and restraints on land use that hinder the owner's ability to alienate the property. See, e.g., Mountain
Brow Lodge No. 82, Indep. Order of Odd Fellows v. Toscano, 64 Cal. Rptr. 816, 818-19 (1967) (distinguishing
restrictions on the alienability of a fee simple, which are general invalid, from restraints on use, which are often
valid).
111
Requiring the sale of certain minimum bundles corresponds to "antifragmentation" rules that are often
associated with preserving marketability. See Heller, supra note 2, at 1176-82. The converse requirement that
items be sold only separately, rather than built into larger transactions, has been explored in the context of rights
and liberties in W. Stephen Westermann, A Theory of Autonomy Entitlements: One View of the Cathedral Nave
Dedicated to Constitutional Rights and Other Individual Liberties (2007) available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=977964, at 18 (discussing "anti-bundling inalienability rules").
112
It is possible to combine these conditions in various ways. For example, the tax code contains some
provisions that link the tax due on the realization of a gain to the holding period of the asset. See, e.g., Stout,
supra note 78, at 703, 733-34; Internal Revenue Service, Tax Facts about Capital Gains and Losses, IRS Tax Tip
2008-35, available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=106799,00.html. This approach effectively
prices alienability within different holding periods. I thank Jonathan Nash for this point. Similarly, some
affordable housing programs phase in the amount of equity that a departing owner is entitled to receive based on
the holding period, again pricing rather than prohibiting alienability. See e.g., J. Peter Byrne & Michael Diamond,
Affordable Housing, Land Tenure, and Urban Policy: The Matrix Revealed, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527, 545-47
(2007).
108
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that restrict its use, or particular entitlement configurations, such as single
square inches of land,113 that are unattractive to most buyers.
Legal rules can affect either dimension or both at the same time.114 Both
are of course relevant to whether a transfer actually occurs.115 Recognizing
this, some scholars have emphasized the ability of alienability restrictions,
like those requiring that property be sold in certain minimum bundles, to
preserve downstream marketability.116 But alienability limits can also have
important upstream impacts on incentives to acquire and use entitlements.
A. Overharvesting
Limits on alienability can respond indirectly to concerns about
inefficient draws on a common pool resource.117 For example, a ban on the
sale of eagle feathers may be instrumental in enforcing a prohibition on
killing eagles; its overbreadth in blocking the sales of eagle parts taken
before the ban went into effect may be justified by difficulties in
distinguishing feathers acquired before the ban from those acquired
afterwards.118 An alienability restriction can have important effects on
harvesting levels even if the ban on acquisition is nonexistent or woefully
underenforced. The reason is straightforward: The incentive to harvest is
magnified if a thick resale market exists for harvested goods.119 Without
113
See Heller, Anticommons, supra note 18, at 682-84 (1998) (discussing Quaker Oats's 1955 "Big Inch"
promotional giveaway in which millions of deeds to square inches of land in the Yukon were packaged in cereal
boxes); see also HELLER, GRIDLOCK, supra note 18, at 6-8 & fig. 1.2.
114
For example, if certain categories of people are legally disabled from receiving or owning a good, the
result is a legally mandated thinning of the market which might be classified both as an alienability restriction and
as an impediment to marketability. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 935-36 (discussing such "limits on
ownership"). In general, we would expect limits on alienability to reduce marketability. For example, a minimum
holding period makes an entitlement harder to transfer both because of the restriction itself (one must wait for the
minimum period to elapse before a transfer can be made) and because of the restriction's effect on the desirability
of the bundle (some prospective buyers will be put off by the holding period). Similarly, taxes on transfers reduce
the surplus available for the parties to a transaction and thus make fewer such transactions worthwhile. In some
cases, however, alienability limits are put in place in an effort to preserve long-run marketability. See infra note
116 and accompanying text.
115
The impact that both elements have on transfers has led some authors to refer to them both as facets of
alienability. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, From H20 to C02: Lessons of Water Rights for Carbon Trading, 50 ARIZ.
L. REV. 91, 105 (2008) (in discussing cap-and-trade programs, noting that "efforts to improve the precision of
property rights limit their alienability"). To distinguish them is not to deny this; on the contrary, it facilitates
viewing them as potential substitutes for each other. See James Salzman and J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the
Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 637 (2000) (distinguishing between, and noting
the substitutability of, ex ante narrowing of the "currency" to be used in environmental trading programs and ex
post limits on the trades themselves).
116
See, e.g., Heller, supra note 2, at 1176-82 (discussing a number of legal doctrines that might serve the
purpose of limiting fragmentation of interests); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 110, at 474 (explaining how the exercise
of "free alienability" might restrict marketability); see also Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J.
1315, 1374 (2003) (discussing "constraints on excessive decomposition").
117
See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, 942-43; Epstein, supra note 2, at 978-88.
118
See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 944-45 (discussing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979), in
which such a ban on sales was upheld against a takings challenge); Heller, supra note 2, at 1211-12 (same); see
also Hsu, supra note 10, at 870 (noting the role of the alienability limits contained in the Endangered Species
Act).
119
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 351-52 (papers and
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this heightened incentive in place, harvesters will likely turn their attention
to other ways of making a living.120 Alienability limits may also help to
reinforce selective acquisition rules, at least to the extent that permitted
categories of harvesting involve personal acquisition by the end user.121 For
example, under certain circumstances Native Americans can obtain a permit
to take an eagle in order to use its tail feathers in a religious ceremony.122
Alienability restrictions can help ensure that the eagles killed pursuant to
the permits are in fact used in the specified ways.
Inside a limited access commons, an alienability restriction can stand in
for other kinds of governance rules.123 The fact that a limited access
commons excludes everyone except for the approved commoners already
makes possible a wider range of formal and informal solutions to collective
action problems than could be sustained in an open access arrangement.124
Nonetheless, some mechanism is necessary to prevent uncooperative
behavior within the commons, and rules restricting alienability represent
one possibility. For example, if a limited group of households is permitted
access to a fish pond, making the withdrawn fish inalienable may obviate
the need to place any firm limit on the number of fish that each household
can withdraw. The demand for fish is effectively capped by the limited
capacity of the commoners to make personal use of the fish, and, assuming
this personal consumption does not threaten the sustainability of the fish
population, the resource will not be overdrawn.125 Richard Epstein has
applied similar analysis to the system of riparian rights.126
Of course, commoners who doubted the continued availability of the
proceedings) (1967) (observing that the development of the fur trade increased both the value of furs and the
intensity of hunting); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 943 (explaining that bans on the sale of fish and game
"facilitate conservation by discouraging the entry of profit seeking hunters or fishermen").
120
Under some circumstances, however, an alienability ban could increase the number of people who
engage in direct acquisition of the resource. For example, if the costs of becoming an eagle hunter were low
enough (taking into account the price of equipment, the cost of relocating to an eagle habitat, and the opportunity
cost of learning how to hunt eagles), people who are unable to buy eagles might resort to taking their own. Thus,
inalienability would seem to work best as a backstop or substitute for acquisition limits where external factors like
location or skill requirements make acquisition prohibitively costly for most people.
121
See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 943-44 (discussing how alienability limits can be of help "when the
state wishes to preserve a group's way of life" and giving examples in which native Alaskans are given broader
hunting and fishing rights than the general public, subject to restrictions on sales).
122
See 16 U.S.C. §668a; 50 C.F.R. § 22.22; discussed in United States v. Friday (10th Cir, May 8, 2008).
123
Commons scholars typically distinguish open-access resources from limited access commons that are
closed to all but specified commoners. See, e.g, ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 48 (1990). For
discussions of alienability in the context of limited access commons, see, e.g Margaret A. McKean, Success on
the Commons: A Comparative Examination of Institutions for Common Property Resource Management, 4 J.
THEORETICAL POL. 247, 261-62 (1992); Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE
L.J. 549, 566 (2001).
124
See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 123.
125
This assumes either that fish are used only in customary ways, such as for bait or food, or that use
restrictions operate in conjunction with alienability limits. Otherwise, the development of new uses for the
resource could cause demand to rise unexpectedly beyond the usual self-enforcing caps associated with satiation.
Cf. Smith, supra note 60, at 473 (explaining that riparianism works as "a rough proxy for quantity" but noting that
some systems add use restrictions that prioritize "natural wants" over "artificial wants").
126
Epstein, supra note 2, at 979-82.
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resource might overharvest even in this context if the resource could be
successfully stockpiled and stored over time for future use. Indeed, the fear
that other commoners might engage in resource-endangering stockpiling
could itself generate such doubt. But unless external forces threatened the
continued viability of the replenishing resource, the problem would take the
form of an assurance game, which should not be difficult for a rational
community to solve.127 An alienability limit, then, could successfully stand
in for a harvesting limit as long as personal consumption does not outstrip
sustainability and commoners have faith in the continued availability of the
resource.
One problem with using an alienability limit in place of a harvesting
limit is the former's rough-gauge nature, which will only generate optimal
harvesting levels under special circumstances. In the fishing example, some
amount of harvesting is efficient, as long as it does not threaten the
sustainability of the fish pond. If personal consumption by the commoners
is below this threshold, we need not worry about overharvesting if
alienability is restricted. However, we might worry about underharvesting;
it would be mere happenstance if personal consumption by the commoners
reached the optimal harvesting level without going over. Although limiting
demand through alienability restrictions is not a very fine-grained way to
limit harvesting, the cost of its imperfections may be less than the added
cost of enforcing a numeric limit on harvests.128
I have focused so far on how the inalienability of resource units129 eases
pressures toward overharvesting by limiting the pool of potential
demanders. In other words, it is the number and consumption habits of the
commoners, and not their identity, that does the work in curtailing resource
withdrawal. There is nothing about this rationale that would call for
limiting the alienability of membership slots within the limited access
commons, at least if problematic selection effects were not at issue.130 Yet,
this latter sort of inalienability has received attention in the literature on
127
The assurance game features payoffs in which each party does best (both individually and jointly) by
cooperating, provided the other party does so as well. See Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Consumer Preferences,
Citizen Preferences, and the Provision of Public Goods, 108 YALE L.J. 377, 392 nn.39-40 (1998) and sources
cited therein (describing the Assurance Game and noting variations of it); Amartya K. Sen, Isolation, Assurance
and the Social Rate of Discount, 81 Q.J. ECON. 112, 114 (1967) (presenting the "Assurance Problem").
128
See Smith, supra note 60, at 473 (discussing the use of "rough prox[ies]" in the context of water rights).
129
See Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: Information as a Common-Pool
Resource, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 121 (2003) (distinguishing a “resource system” from “resource
units”); Dean Lueck, First Possession as the Basis of Property, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT,
AND LAW 200, 202 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003) (distinguishing resource “stocks”
from“flows”).
130
If the original members of the limited access commons won their slots by some means other than a free
market allocation, and if potential members are heterogeneous in their capacity to demand the resource, then
making the slots alienable might introduce "super-demanders" who would consume the resource at much higher
levels than did the departing members they are replacing. Alienability would not introduce a selection effect if the
original allocation already drew in super-demanders, or if the resource is of a type for which demand does not
vary widely among individuals or households.
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limited access commons,131 and it is worth noting why it might be
important, either on its own or in combination with limits on the alienability
of resource units. If the sustainability of a resource in a limited access
commons depends to some extent on cooperation among the commoners, as
will typically be the case, then longevity within the community may be
useful in fostering that cooperation. Not only might the commoners gain
experience with each other that would foster trust, but the game among
them would be turned by virtue of inalienability into one of indefinite repeat
play.132
Another consideration, explored further in the next section, relates to the
mechanism for allocating slots within the limited access commons in the
first instance. If this mechanism is designed to select for (or induce selfselection for) cooperative tendencies, then free alienability would undo that
selection work. On this account, alienability restrictions lower the cost of
cooperation by avoiding the need to reapply selection criteria over time.
The price, of course, is that higher valuers who would be capable of
meeting those criteria are shut out.
Now that we have seen how alienability limits can supplement or
substitute for direct acquisition rules in preventing overharvesting, it is
worth noting two other possible margins for intervention: use and
exclusion. To return to the fishing example, suppose that instead of directly
limiting the take or indirectly controlling it through restrictions on
alienability, limits were instead placed on how fish could be used. For
example, a prohibition on freezing (or perhaps even refrigerating) the fish
would effectively force it to be used locally for immediate consumption, or
not at all. Alternatively, processing the fish to produce fishmeal, fish oil, or
fish sticks might be prohibited, while its use for fillets (or as treats for seals)
might be permitted. This approach would limit demand for the fish in ways
that, depending on conditions in the relevant markets, might have the effect
of deterring overharvesting. But it would also have the disadvantage of
arbitrarily eliminating categories of uses that might be more highly valued.
Adding exclusion rights—as through parcelization—represents a wellknown response to commons tragedies.133 However, such alternatives are
not always feasible; some resources, such as water or roving animal
populations, cannot be contained by boundary lines or fences.134 More
interestingly, limits on exclusion can also reduce overharvesting incentives,
albeit in a much blunter way. In the fishing case, we might imagine
something like Michael Heller's "Poach Pond," where catching fish confers
131

See, e.g, McKean, supra note 123, at 261-62; Dagan & Heller, supra note 123, at 566.
See, e.g., Dagan & Heller, supra note 123, at 574-77.
See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 123, at 12-13; Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315,
1327-30 (2003).
134
See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 123, at 13; Smith, supra note 60, at 448 & n.10.
132
133
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no rights of ownership at all.135 Because anyone may appropriate fish from
anyone else (up until the point of actual consumption), people may not
bother fishing, choosing instead "to wait on shore and poach others'
catches."136 Heller goes on to explain that underfishing might not be the
inevitable result; indeed, depending on the costs of fishing and the costs of
preventing poaching through self-help, overfishing might even result.137 In
any case, removing property rights from the fish would be highly unlikely
to yield optimal fishing rates, and would almost certainly entail wasteful
fighting over resources.138
A liability rule regime represents a different kind of intrusion into the
right to exclude,139 and one that would avoid the wasteful fights of Poach
Pond. Suppose, for example, that anyone could take any fish from any
fisher by paying a preset fee. Depending on the level of the fee, the
frequency with which this option is exercised, and the structure of the
market, fishing levels might well be affected.140
In sum, restricting alienability is one way to turn back threats to a
common resource, but it must be compared with other available chokepoints
for managing the potential tragedy. Significantly, inalienability does its
work in this story through ex ante incentive effects: without the prospect of
selling, those with access to the resource have a dampened incentive to
harvest.
B. Underinvestment
People may be insufficiently motivated to produce goods for which they
cannot fully internalize the benefits.141 This point is often made in
connection with "public goods," which are nonrival and nonexcludable.142
135

Heller, Anticommons, supra note 18, at 675.
Id.
Id.
138
It is difficult to say much about an example like Poach Pond without more information about the other
rights (and their enforcement levels) that form the backdrop against which fish may be taken. For example, if a
fisher could quickly put the fish in her (privately owned) basket and clutch it to her person, the lack of property
rights in the fish itself might be of little moment—some other right of the individual would be violated in wresting
the fish away. See, e.g., Matthew H. Kramer, Rights Without Trimmings, in A DEBATE OVER RIGHTS:
PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRIES 11-13 (Matthew H. Kramer et al., eds., 1998) (explaining how rights may "effectively
shield" other, unprotected liberties); Balganesh, supra note 3, at 604-05 (citing Kramer and discussing this
"shielding thesis"). If we instead assume a regime in which no private property rights exist at all, other questions
emerge—such as how a fisher comes to possess the equipment for catching fish in the first place.
139
The right to exclude is usually associated with property rule protection, which in turn is typified by
injunctive relief. For a discussion of this view and a challenge to it, see generally Balganesh, supra note 3.
140
Cf. Lucian Bebchuk, The Ex Ante View of the Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REV. 601, 633 (2001) (discussing
how the choice between property rules and liability rules bears on ex ante investment choices).
141
Underprovision will not result if enough of the benefits are internalized to make the efficient level of
provision worthwhile. See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257,
276 (2007) (arguing that full internalization is unnecessary to incentivize innovation). This is the flip side of the
observation that negative externalities will not always produce inefficiencies. See, e.g., James M. Buchanan &
Wm. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 371, 380–81 (1962).
142
See, e.g., Richard Cornes & Todd Sandler, The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods 6136
137
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Some public goods, such as national defense, are provided by the
government, with contributions coercively collected through taxation. But
there are many other settings in which people cannot capture all of the
benefits of their actions. When I paint my house or mow the yard, for
example, my neighbors need not pay me for the spillover benefits they
receive.143 Often outsiders can be excluded from a nonrival good—whether
formally, in the case of club goods that can be accessed only by members,
or informally, when the good's effects are geographically bounded and most
people are too far away to receive any benefit.144 Even so, the good will
remain nonexcludable within the club or within the locality, creating the
risk that insiders will fail to make sufficient investments.
Use restrictions that directly compel a set of inputs represent one
response. For example, households that purchase homes in a common
interest community agree to be bound by a set of covenants, which may
include affirmative obligations with regard to upkeep and maintenance.
Zoning laws or other local ordinances can operate similarly.145 But
specifying inputs and monitoring to detect and punish violations can be
prohibitively costly in some contexts. Consider, for example, the local
public good of collective cheering and enthusiasm at a sporting event or
musical concert. Issuing mandates that people cheer at particular intervals
upon pain of ejection from the stadium is unlikely to be a viable strategy.
Instead, one might devise acquisition requirements that induce especially
enthusiastic people to self-select. If willingness to pay were a good proxy
for enthusiasm levels, ordinary market allocation with full alienability
would do the trick. But given different background wealth levels, this may
be far from the case.
Perhaps in part for this reason, it is commonplace for entertainments
that depend on crowd enthusiasm for their success to be sold below marketclearing prices.146 The resulting queue acts as a screening device that
7 (1986).
143
See, e.g., Ariel Porat, Expanding Restitution: Liability for Unrequested Benefits, U of Chicago Law &
Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 388, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1088796 (2008), at 2-4.
144
On club goods, see, e.g., James M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 1 (Feb.
1965). On distance as a de facto exclusionary mechanism, see Thráinn Eggertsson, Open Access Versus Common
Property, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 73, 76 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S.
McChesney eds., 2003).
145
For a recent example, see Associated Press, Mow Your Lawn ... or Risk Jail Time in Canton, Ohio (June
3, 2008).
146
See Allan C. DeSerpa, To Err is Rational: A Theory of Excess Demand for Tickets, 15 MANAG. &
DECISION ECON. 511, 515-17 (1994) (presenting a model of concert pricing in which "the highest-demand buyers
in terms of money price will generally not be the 'best audience' in their own estimation"; if "propensities to make
noise are inversely correlated with pure reservation prices" scalping could reduce welfare by pricing out the part
of the audience that is most essential to the experience); see also Gary S. Becker, A Note on Restaurant Pricing
and Other Examples of Social Influences on Price, 99 J. POL. ECON. 1109 (1991) (noting the social interaction
effects associated with consuming events); Michael Rothschild & Lawrence J. White, The Analytics of the Pricing
of Higher Education and Other Services in Which the Customers are Inputs, 103 J. POLIT. ECON. 573, 581 n.15
(1995) (suggesting that enthusiasm-related externalities produced by season ticket-holders at sporting events
might explain the lower prices and other benefits offered to that group).
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arguably does a better job of weeding out the unenthusiastic than could
price alone.147 This two-part pricing mechanism of money and queuing will
fall apart, however, if free alienability of tickets is permitted. Limits on
ticket "scalping," then, can be understood as helping to insure adequate
investments in a local public good (crowd enthusiasm) by getting good
cooperators in that endeavor to select themselves into the crowd.148 Of
course, if a ticket-holder cannot attend the game and is unable to alienate
her ticket, the resulting empty seat is presumably worse for crowd morale—
not to mention concession stand sales—than even the most unenthusiastic
attendee.149 But that result could be avoided with a simple mechanism for
reselling tickets to the ticket issuer; full alienability at market-clearing
prices would not be necessary.
In other settings, inalienability operates even more straightforwardly to
ensure that appropriate investments are made in local public goods.150
Consider higher education admissions policies, which try to select those
who will be good contributors to the academic and social climate of the
school, as well as to the public good of the school's reputation (shared by all
past and future graduates). One cannot sell one's seat in Acme Law
School's entering class, nor can one sell one's diploma from that institution,
because doing so would substitute pure market allocation methods for other
allocation mechanisms that are deemed better at inducing meaningful
cooperation in the relevant educational and reputational enterprises. The
alienability restriction is essential to enforcing acquisition limits.
A different and presumably unsustainable way of running a law school
would be to allow free alienability of seats, but require students to make
particular, specified investments both while in school and after graduating,
on pain of ejection from the school or (later) revocation of the diploma.
These requirements would amount to use restrictions on the law school seat
or diploma. Limits on exclusion might also be employed in conjunction
147
The queue may also be sought for its own sake by the purveyors of the entertainment, as evidence of
popular demand. See Becker, supra note 146 , at 1110 (positing that certain pricing strategies may be explained
by the fact that "the pleasure from a good is greater when many people want to consume it").
148
The economic literature on ticket scalping suggests a number of alternative explanations for opposition to
the practice. See, e.g., James L. Swofford, Arbitrage, Speculation, and Public Policy Toward Ticket Scalping, 27
PUB. FIN. REV. 531 (1999) (producers wish to pass surplus to consumers to build goodwill); Courty, supra note
75, at 94-95 (producers wish to distance themselves from scalpers due to consumer pressure, or want to capture
the "late market" themselves); Craig Depken, II, Another Look at Anti-Scalping Laws: Theory and Evidence, 130
PUB. CHOICE 55 (2007) (reviewing past literature and examining effects on prices).
149
See Chris Isidore, In Defense of $10,000 Super Bowl Tickets, cnnmoney.com, Jan. 31, 2007 (discussing
financial impact of no-shows).
150
Susan Rose-Ackerman discusses this point using the example of the Homesteading Acts, under which
homesteaders could acquire title only by holding the land for some period of time and improving it in specified
ways. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 940, 957-59. Here, both use and alienability restrictions were bundled
within a protracted acquisition protocol, which arguably induced self-selection by (only) those willing and able to
make the prescribed investments on the land. See id. at 960-61. For a counterargument that homesteading laws
may have actually impeded settlement by placing too many restrictions on the land, see Epstein, supra note 2, at
989.
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with use restrictions. For example, the institution could retain a call option
on the seat and the diploma, which could be exercised if investment levels
fell below certain standards. Law school already fits this model to the
extent that nondisruptive class attendance and some minimum level of exam
performance condition one's entitlement to remain. But inalienability
remains central, complementing these other efforts to elicit appropriate
investments.
Inalienability's role in facilitating the distribution of in-kind benefits,
such as subsidized housing or food stamps, can also be understood as an
investment problem.151 Those providing the in-kind benefits want the
holders of the entitlement to invest in a public good—poverty alleviation—
using specified means. Some people are not well-positioned to invest in
poverty alleviation by those means, either because they are not poor or
because they do not wish to use the offered goods. Inalienability not only
facilitates the application of means-testing to recipients, but also induces
self-selection by those who find the in-kind benefits valuable.152 Indeed,
even in the absence of a government program, people seeking to access the
resources of others might signal their willingness to engage in poverty
reduction by requesting in-kind assistance of a sort that is very difficult to
alienate, such as a hot meal.153
These examples involving the below-market-price provision of
resources relate to a larger point about alienability limits: their role in
facilitating price discrimination.154 The efficiency story surrounding price
discrimination is complex,155 but Demsetz's observation that price
discrimination can facilitate the private production of public goods seems
especially relevant to this paper's focus on collective action problems.156
Inalienability in service of price discrimination might, therefore, offer an
alternative to coercive taxation under some circumstances.
151
See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 940, 961 (discussing the relevance of alienability restrictions to
welfare policy).
152
See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 940, 961 (explaining how alienability restrictions can lead those for
whom a benefit is intended to self-identify, and can ration goods to those who will use them themselves). Cf.
David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand: The Rise of the Personal Choice Model for Rationing Public
Benefits, 113 YALE L.J. 815, 825-32 (2004) (discussing how informal rationing of welfare benefits might be
accomplished through differential responses to various requirements and hurdles, as well as the possibility that
such mechanisms would fail to select for need).
153
A signal must be more costly for those who lack the desired underlying characteristic than for those who
possess it. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ET AL. GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 123 (1994) (defining signaling).
Requesting food always entails some up-front costs (in time, effort, or dignity), but the food itself provides a
larger offsetting benefit for those in dire need of a meal than it would for the well-fed. Thus, a soup kitchen
featuring food that is difficult to transport or resell operates as a screening device. See id. (defining screening);
see generally Super, supra note 152 (similar analysis regarding design of welfare policy).
154
See, e.g., R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44 B.C. L. REV.
577, 625-27 (2003).
155
See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 103; Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1449, 1505-08 (2004).
156
See Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, `13 J. L. & ECON. 293, 301-04 (1970).
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C. Holding Out
The tragedy of the commons, which manifests either in overharvesting
or underinvestment behaviors, has been paired in the literature with the
tragedy of the anticommons.157 In an anticommons, a desired use of a
resource requires assembling permission or fragmentary entitlements from a
number of parties. Aside from the obvious costs of communicating and
coordinating with large numbers of parties, the anticommons presents a
central strategic dilemma—the possibility that a party whose entitlement is
crucial to the necessary assembly will attempt to "hold out" for a larger
share of the assembly surplus.158 Each fragment holder has a veto power
enabling her to block the whole assembly (assuming all pieces are truly
indispensable), creating the possibility that value will be dissipated in
negotiations, that negotiations will break down altogether preventing an
efficient assembly from taking place, or that the potential for these results
will deter any effort at negotiations.159 The essential problem is one of a
"thin market" in which transactions must occur, if at all, between specific
parties.160
This same problem of monopoly power can arise in two-party
interactions as well, and several of the examples above—domain names,
land use rights, damaging information, and perhaps patents in some cases—
present the famously costly bilateral monopoly. The structure of the
problem is the same as in the anticommons, in that the holder of the
property holds a veto power or monopoly over an entitlement essential to
the desired resource use of another party. Again, value is dissipated as the
high valuer and the entitlement holder vie for larger shares of the often
enormous surplus that will be generated by the transfer. If the parties bluff
too hard, the deal may not go through at all.161 Both the dissipation of value
through wrangling and the thwarted exchange produce inefficiencies.162
It is worth emphasizing here that property's grant of veto power is not an
unusual or anomalous feature, but rather lies at the heart of the institution

157
See, e.g., Heller, Anticommons, supra note 18; James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies:
Commons and Anticommons, 43 J.L. & ECON. 1 (2000). The anticommons idea originated in a thought experiment
by Frank Michelman. See Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics and the Law of Property, in NOMOS XXIV:
ETHICS, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 3, 6, 9 (1982).
158
For an extended discussion of this point, see Fennell, supra note 18, at 926-29; 946-52; see generally
Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1991).
159
See, e.g. Fennell, supra note 18, at 926-29; 946-52; Cohen, supra note 158.
160
See Merrill, supra note 41, at 76-78.
161
Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More Salute to Ronald
Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553, 577 (1993) (explaining that in private necessity cases "the bargaining range is so
large that there is some risk that no deal will be struck as each side campaigns for the larger fraction of the
contested domain").
162
See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 706-07 (9th ed. 2008) (noting these
risks in the context of injunctive relief).
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itself.163 The temporal, spatial, and conceptual bounds of an owner's
holdings limit the significance of the resulting monopoly power in most
circumstances.164 For example, nearby pieces of property are often very
close substitutes for each other, despite each being locationally unique.165
Nonetheless, so long as property rule protection remains in force, each
owner controls something that no other person can precisely supply.
Deciding when to recognize and when to restrict that monopoly power is a
central dilemma in property law.
This problem is usually approached by weighing the benefits and risks
of reducing exclusion rights through liability rules. But such limits on
exclusion represent only one of several possible points of intervention;
monopoly power giving rise to holdout problems might instead be
addressed through limits on alienability, use, or acquisition, or some
combination of these. These approaches seek not to wrest the entitlement
from the hands of the lower-valuing monopolist but to increase the chance
that the higher-valuing user will have the entitlement at the outset.
Acquisition limits attempt this directly: Some proxy characteristic thought
to correlate with being a high valuing user of the entitlement is made a
prerequisite of entitlement acquisition. To make the limitation meaningful,
further alienability must be restricted to those possessing the same proxy
characteristic. Use limits could similarly act as screens, especially if a use is
compelled that strategic resellers would find costly.166
Alienability restrictions more straightforwardly select against those
whose primary value is in reselling. Instead of an administrator choosing a
proxy characteristic capable of distinguishing between high and low
valuers, resale limits induce self-selection by those who are relatively high
valuers.167 For example, parties might be required to hold the entitlement
for some period of time before reselling it. If the holding period were set at
a level that would be unprofitably long for those bent on resale but
comfortably short for anyone making personal use of the entitlement, it
would tend to screen out low-valuing acquirers.168 Complete bans on
alienability would even more strongly discourage acquisition by low valuers
hoping to resell. Thus, alienability restrictions can draw low valuers out of
163
The power to veto a transaction is the defining characteristic of "property rules," which, true to their name,
commonly protect property interests. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1092 (defining property rules,
which grant the entitlement holder the power to refuse a transfer if she wishes).
164
See Richard A. Epstein, Justified Monopolies: Regulating Pharmaceuticals and Telecommunications, 56
CASE W. RES. 103, 108-09 (2005).
165
See id.
166
See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 955-61 (discussing "coerced use").
167
See BAIRD, ET AL. supra note 153, at 122-123 (explaining how screening induces revelation of private,
nonverifiable information); text accompanying notes 213-217, infra (discussing self-selection).
168
See, e.g., Ngai Pindell, Fear and Loathing: Combating Speculation in Local Economies, 39 U. MICH. J.
L. REFORM 543 (2006) (urging a three-year holding period for the first purchasers of newly constructed residential
property to discourage real-estate speculation).
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the marketplace without the need for any administrative judgments about
absolute or relative valuations. The exit of these would-be transactors can,
in turn, forestall costly holdout problems that might otherwise emerge.169
However, this benefit comes with some significant costs attached.
Figure 1, which sets out the effects of alienability restrictions schematically,
illustrates the resulting tradeoff.

Figure 1: Effects of Inalienability
would-be
buyers

source

exiting
middlepeople

high-valuing
end users

other end users

In this schematic, the entitlement in question comes from some
"source." If resale of the entitlement is restricted, a category of potential
acquirers ("middlepeople") will exit from the market, as indicated by the
dashed middle box. With the middlepeople out of the picture, high valuers
can acquire the good directly from the source and avoid any bargaining or
holdout problems associated with buying from an intermediary. But the exit
of the middlepeople also generates a number of potential costs, the
existence and magnitude of which will depend on empirical facts about the
relevant markets and on the specific design of the inalienability rule in
use.170
First, to the extent that the middlepeople were actually reaching a group
of would-be buyers who would not otherwise acquire the good (here, the
dashed upper righthand box), there is an efficiency loss. Here, we confront
the question raised in Part I.C of whether the intermediaries are offering
anything of value by bridging a divide of some kind, whether spatial,
temporal, informational, or risk-based. Second, while the inability to resell
169
This is not to suggest that high valuers or long-term holders are temperamentally disinclined to
strategically squeeze surplus out of a deal when they can. The point is simply that fewer transactions (and hence
fewer potentially problematic transactions) are necessary to move goods to their highest valuers if those who
acquire in the first place are more likely to be high valuers themselves.
170
See Part III, infra.
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will weed out many low valuers, not all of those who acquire the good for
their own use will necessary be (or remain over time) the highest valuers of
the good. Indeed, with no middlepeople competing to snap up entitlements,
hold them, and route them to higher valuers, this result becomes more
likely. Thus, restrictions that block resales may lock goods in suboptimal
uses, as indicated by the black horizontal bar in the right lower block of
Figure 1.
Finally, any drop in overall demand that results from the exit of the
middlepeople could change the amount of the good that is produced at the
source.171 Whether this will be the case, and whether it will be problematic,
depends on the nature of the good. Inventions, for example, are likely to be
more sensitive to changes in demand than domain names, which are simply
combinations of letters or words drawn from the preexisting language. In
some cases, a drop in demand could actually increase production, as where
natural resources are concerned. Reducing the demand for fish, for example,
could increase the overall fish population.
III. INALIENABILITY'S DOMAIN
The discussion to this point has established two things. First, the
transfer of some goods that seem appropriately market-allocated can
nonetheless generate anxiety, some of which is grounded in inefficiency.
Second, inalienability offers one possible, if imperfect, response—a point
that becomes especially clear when we see alienability as one margin that
might be adjusted to control commons and anticommons tragedies. Taken
together, these observations lead us to ask whether, and under what
circumstances, inalienability could offer useful traction for resource
dilemmas in general and holdout problems in particular. In the balance of
the paper, I take up that inquiry.
While I look at how inalienability rules might serve efficiency goals, the
distributive effects of choices about alienability are also relevant—whether
as an independent reason for making an adjustment, or as an additional
benefit or countervailing consideration. Significantly, inalienability rules
can influence the division of surplus that results from a transfer by limiting
the range of possible bargains.172 More generally, alienability underpins
property's dual character as a source of wealth-building potential and as a
source of consumption value.173 Because inalienability breaks apart these
171

For a discussion of the relevance of output to questions of alienability, see Levmore, supra note 7, at 116-

21.
172

See infra Part III.A.3.
This dichotomy appears frequently in the property literature, often building explicitly on KARL MARX,
CAPITAL: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CAPITALIST PRODUCTION 2-8 (Frederick Engels, ed; Samuel Moore &
Edward Aveling, transl.) (14th ed., 1912) (defining and distinguishing "use-value" and "exchange value"). See,
e.g., JOHN LOGAN & HARVEY MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLACE (20th
173
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two elements, it may be sought where use, but not wealth extraction, is
viewed as normatively desirable.174 Other normative considerations,
including the preservation of autonomy, also play a role in evaluating
alienability choices.
I start by cataloguing the ways in which alienability can be adjusted and
showing how these adjustments interact with other features of property
entitlements. Inalienability rules—no less than liability rules—can be finetuned in numerous ways to achieve particular objectives. With this
expanded menu in mind, I examine how inalienability rules stack up against
restrictions on exclusion and use. I close with some specific suggestions for
better integrating inalienability into the legal toolkit.
A. Alienability Adjustments
Calabresi and Melamed and their successors have generally conceived
of inalienability rules as different in kind from property rules and liability
rules.175 There is some basis for this intuition. Property rules and liability
rules represent different ways of dividing up control over the fact and the
terms of the entitlement transfer between owners and nonowners.176 In the
case of completely inalienable goods, in contrast, control over potential
transactions is held socially rather than split between the transacting parties.
But absolute bans on alienability are relatively rare, and the entitlements to
which they apply most clearly tend to be those for which the appellation of
"property" is highly questionable.177 More commonly, alienability is
restricted, not prohibited. Adjustments to alienability thus typically occur
against a backdrop in which control over transfers has already been divided
up in some manner between owners and nonowners.178 Revisiting the
different ways that transaction control can be allocated offers a convenient
starting point for examining how inalienability rules can change things.
anniversary edition, 2007); Eduardo Peñalver, Land Virtues, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1138714. See also Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV.
822, 837-38 (1993) ("in-kind enjoyment" and "monetary compensation"); J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE
26 (1996) ("the use of things and the allocation of items of social wealth") See, e.g., JOHN CHRISTMAN, THE
MYTH OF PROPERTY 128 (1994) ("control ownership" and "income ownership")
174
E.g., Ayres & Madison, supra note 2, at 85-87.
175
See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1093 (describing "inalienability rules" as "quite different
from property and liability rules" in that they "not only 'protect' the entitlement" but "may also be viewed as
limiting or regulating the grant of the entitlement itself").
176
My focus on "control" here echoes in part and diverges in part from Christman's characterization of
"control rights" as distinct from "income rights." See CHRISTMAN, supra note 173, at 127-131.
177
It is not clear whether inalienability is a cause or a consequence of the item's uncertain property status in
these cases. Compare Honoré, supra note 5, at 181 ("When the legislature or courts think than an interest should
be alienable and transmissible, they reify it and say that it can be owned.") with J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF
PROPERTY IN LAW 130 (1997) (saying of choses in action, that "[i]t is not because they are alienable that they are
things. Rather it is because they are things that they are alienable").
178
Owners are often in the role of "sellers" and nonowners in the role of "buyers," although a number of
other owner/nonowner pairings are possible (such as donor and donee, mortgagor and mortgagee, takee and taker,
or defendant and plaintiff).

18-Nov-08]

ADJUSTING ALIENABILITY

37

1. Two Dimensions of Control Over Transfers
Control over transfers is divided between owners and nonowners along
two dimensions, as shown in Figure 2.179

Figure 2: Control Over Transactions
Transfer
Type
Elements
of Control
Whether
Transfer Occurs
Transfer Price

Call Option
Nonowner
Control
Collective or
Owner Control

Voluntary
Transfer

Put Option

Owner-Nonowner Owner Control
Control
Owner-Nonowner Collective or
Control
Nonowner
Control

First, consider the degree of control that the owner has over the fact of
the transaction.180 This control can range from zero, when the entitlement is
subject to a "call option" held by another party, to absolute, when the
entitlement comes with a "put option" that lets the owner force a sale on
another party.181 In between these extremes we find the usual case, where
the owner is free to initiate and resist transactions, but may only complete a
transaction with the agreement of a willing buyer (or donee). The "Whether
Transfer Occurs" row in Figure 2 sets out these possibilities. Voluntary
transfers, which require the consent of both parties, take place in the domain
of property rules. Calls and puts represent two types of liability rules, with

179
A recent working paper by Matteo Rizzolli includes a figure that similarly sets out three columns for
"put-option liability rule," "property rule" and "call-option liability rule." Rizzolli, supra note 2, §3.1, fig. 3-1.
Rizzolli's schematic, however, is used to illustrate the Hohfeldian equivalents that each party holds under each
type of rule and to make observations about the effects of call options and put options, respectively, on the
ownership package. My depiction differs in that it breaks apart the two elements of transfer control represented
by the two rows in Figure 2. This approach yields a refinement in conclusions. Rizzolli indicates that "the bundle
of rights is 'enriched' under the put-option liability rules," but my analysis shows a more complex picture: a put
option grants more control over the fact of the transfer but withdraws control from the owner over the price at
which the transfer occurs. For further discussion of the operation of put options, see, e.g., Ayres, supra note 90, at
804-05.
180
See Morris, supra note 173, 833-37, 843 (discussing "initiation power" and "veto power," both of which
involve control over whether a transfer occurs and which collectively amount to "transfer control" or "a transfer
autonomy element").
181
See e.g., id. at 851-56 (describing the liability rule or call option and the "reverse liability rule" or put
option).
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the "call" version corresponding to ordinary or traditional liability rules.182
Second, there is the degree of control that the owner has over the price
at which the transfer, if any, will occur. Once again, this can range from
zero, as when the strike price of a call or put option is set by someone else,
to absolute, when the owner can specify the price and the buyer is bound to
accept it. The typical case lies in between, where the price, and hence the
division of surplus from the transfer, is subject to negotiation. The "Transfer
Price" row in Figure 2 reflects how price control is split up under calls,
voluntary transfers, and puts, respectively. For both calls and puts, the
transfer price may be set in more than one way. Two possibilities are
expressly noted: that a collective decisionmaker such as a court or agency
would set the price, or that the party not holding the option would have
previously set the price ("written the option") for the other party to exercise.
Although most discussions of liability rules presuppose that transfer prices
will be determined by a collective body, it is also possible to devise systems
that place pricing in the hands of the party against whom the option can be
exercised.183
As Calabresi and Melamed recognized, more than one transfer type may
apply to a given entitlement, such as a house.184 Property rules featuring
voluntary transfers are usually the order of the day, but the government
holds a call option when it acts pursuant to its eminent domain powers. The
owner may also be said to hold a put option that may be exercised against
the government and possibly also her mortgagee. She can forcibly transfer
the property to the government by failing to pay her property taxes,185 and
in non-recourse states (or if she is holding a non-recourse loan, or is
otherwise judgment proof), she can effectively force the mortgagee to
"purchase" the property from her at a price equal to her unpaid balance on
the home loan.186

182
See id.; Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Optimal Delegation and Decoupling in the Design of Liability
Rules, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2001). Scholars have identified numerous ways to structure and combine calls and
puts in order to achieve particular objectives. For a recent treatment with discussions of other relevant literature,
see IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS (2005). These complex alternatives
are not reflected in Figure 2, but could play a role in designing real-world inalienability rules.
183
See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1406, 1416-17 (2005).
184
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1093.
185
More generally, we might treat any abandonment right as a put option good against the world, at a strike
price of zero. Cf. Peter Huang, Lawsuit Abandonment Options in Possibly Frivolous Litigation Games, 23 REV.
LITIG 47 (2004). If proper disposal is required (as for hazardous wastes) the put option may carry a negative price
or the transfer may require the consent of the transferee. For a discussion of the limits that the law places on
abandonment, including a general prohibition on the abandonment of land, see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right
to Abandon, unpublished manuscript on file with author.
186
Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph Adamson, The Law & Economics of Subprime Lending (March 2008). George
Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 08-17 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1106907,
manuscript at 26 (noting anecdotal evidence of the increasing numbers of homeowners exercising this "put
option" against the lender as housing prices fall).
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2. Alienability Restrictions and Transaction Control
Alienability restrictions can alter the control that the parties have over
the fact of the transfer or the control that the parties have over the transfer
price. Alternatively, a restriction might specify that certain kinds of sales
attempts, when coupled with other criteria, will trigger a shift from the
voluntary transfer column in Figure 2 to the call or put option columns, or
give rise to other consequences, such as criminal penalties. These
possibilities will be discussed in turn.
Limits on Whether a Transfer Occurs. The law need not merely divide
up control over transfers between owners and nonowners; it may also limit
the conditions under which transfers may occur even if the parties wish it.
Such conditions and limitations can take many forms, ranging from taxes or
procedural requirements, to substantive criteria that the parties must meet to
engage in a transfer (such as holding periods or age restrictions), to
restrictions on when or how a particular good may be sold,187 to outright
bans on transfers. Private parties may also seek to limit alienability in
various ways. While the law generally prohibits outright limits on
alienability, it may permit more limited restrictions on exactly how and
when a good may be resold.188
Legal controls on alienability do not always operate to constrict the
universe of circumstances in which transfers may occur. Instead, the law
might mandate that transfers occur once certain prerequisites have been
met. Civil rights laws, for example, mandate that transfers of entitlements
to jobs, housing, and access to public accommodations not be withheld
based on membership in a protected class. These laws can be understood as
prescribing the bundling of alienability; an owner's decision to extend
access to some requires extending equivalent access to others. In other
contexts, the law may require that transfers convey a particular package of
rights rather than some subset thereof.
Restrictions on the Transfer Price. It is also possible to directly
constrain the price at which a transfer may occur. At the extreme, goods
may be made market-inalienable so that they must transfer at a price of zero
187
Such restrictions might set minimum or maximum quantities or require that goods be sold in particular
configurations. See supra note 111. Legal doctrines that specify what particular sorts of transfer must convey,
such as the patent exhaustion doctrine and the first-sale doctrine in copyright, fall into this category. See Richard
A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property, U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper
No. 423 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=123627, at 28-49 (discussing these and other intellectual
property doctrines from the perspective of alienability).
188
See e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 55, at 195-96 (noting the law's general disfavor of alienability
restrictions for estates in land, as well as a slightly more permissive approach to partial restrictions or certain
restrictions placed on life estates).
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or not at all.189 Lesser restrictions, such as price floors or ceilings might be
imposed by regulation or through contractual or servitude arrangements.
Such restrictions limit how surplus can be divided between the parties, and
in so doing, may either facilitate or discourage efficient transfers. For
example, price caps could make an efficient transfer unprofitable for the
seller, while price floors could make an efficient transfer unprofitable for
the buyer. On the other hand, removing some ground from the possible
bargaining range could facilitate transactions by cabining stratagems.190
Notably, the law can limit control over the transfer price not only by
specifying permissible prices (or price bands), but also by specifying the
protocol that must be used by the parties to arrive at a price. For example,
mandatory transfer protocols (such as auctions) might grant power over the
price to parties other than the seller.191 In addition, the law can decide the
degree to which it will permit private parties to place limits on the prices
that may be charged by others.192
Triggers for Control Shifts or Penalties. Alienability restrictions need
not directly alter the substantive conditions for transfer or the permissible
price. Instead, attempted alienation can be made a triggering condition for a
shift of control—over transfer price, the fact of the transfer, or both—
between owners and nonowners.193 Here, the timing and circumstances of
an entitlement's attempted sale might be treated as important factors in
deciding whether to chip away at the property bundle in other ways or to
subject the owner to some form of liability. For example, property rule
protection might be downgraded to liability rule protection following
certain kinds of sales offers when other criteria are present (collectively
comprising a set of "switching rules"). Alternatively, penalties might apply
to an attempted sale, as in the blackmail case.
This alternative amounts to a de facto restriction on the entitlement's
alienability, akin to a forfeiture restraint on alienability. However, one may
lose more or less than the entitlement upon attempting to sell. One might
merely lose the chance to extract surplus from the transfer. Or, in some
cases, one might be subject to sanctions that are more serious than the loss
189

See Radin, supra note 8, at 1850 (coining the term "market-inalienability").
See Ayres & Madison, supra note 2, at 103-05 (citing and discussing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING
WITH THE STATE 57-58 (1993)).
191
A sale through a "no reserve" auction would also involve relinquishing control over the fact of the
transfer, while setting a reserve would preserve a veto over the transaction if the price falls below a certain level.
For a discussion of the potential role of auctions in addressing hold-out problems, see infra Part III.C.1.
192
See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2007) (holding that vertical
price restraints are not per se violations of the Sherman Act but rather "are to be judged by the rule of reason").
193
Such arrangements are an example of what Bell and Parchomovsky have termed "pliability rules." See
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2002) (discussing "contingent
rules that provide an entitlement owner with property rule or liability rule protection as long as some specified
condition obtains; however, once the relevant condition changes, a different rule protects the entitlement").
190

18-Nov-08]

ADJUSTING ALIENABILITY

41

of the entitlement. Interestingly, using an attempted sale as a trigger for
further examination and potential negative consequences seems to be a
fairly popular legal strategy, as the law surrounding both patents and
domain names suggests. By providing for case-by-case review of the
surrounding circumstances, the law can avoid placing a categorical
blockade on sales. But the review introduces costs of its own, including
uncertainty for owners and potential owners.
3. Stronger or Weaker?
Interestingly, it is not always clear whether alienability restrictions
weaken or strengthen property rights. The ambiguity arises because
alienability's value derives not only from the freedom to engage in (and
resist) transfers, but also from the ability to extract surplus from those
transfers. Certain limitations on transactions that make them less likely to
occur can also increase the surplus that a buyer or seller will receive if a
transaction does occur. Thus, a rule that limits bargaining options may
simultaneously enhance bargaining leverage.194 For example, requiring that
jobs or leaseholds come bundled with particular (non-waivable) protections
may simultaneously decrease the chances of landing one of these
entitlements while increasing the surplus that will be gleaned in that
event.195 Where alienability restrictions apply across the board, they can
solve collective action problems that might otherwise lead individuals to
cave in separately to the surplus-draining demands made by a party with
more leverage.196 These possibilities offer an intuitive explanation of why
greater freedom to alienate may actually be less desirable.197
194

Russell Hardin, The Utilitarian Logic of Liberalism, 97 ETHICS 47, 58-62 (1986); see also THOMAS
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 22 (1960). (noting "that in bargaining, weakness is often strength,
freedom may be freedom to capitulate"); Arthur Kuflick, The Utilitarian Logic of Inalienable Rights, 97 ETHICS
75, 86 (1986) (explaining that while making the right to divorce inalienable may keep some prospective couples
away from the altar, it also removes a bargaining chip from the table that could introduce imbalances into many
marriages that would occur in any case).
195
Cf. Hardin, supra note 194, at 61 (observing that a ban on selling oneself into slavery prevents the
destitute from making deals they might prefer, but ensures that the next group up the economic ladder will be free
workers rather than slaves).
196
See id. at 58-62 (discussing the nine-hour work day and other examples). This line of reasoning seems to
explain the position taken by tenant farmers in Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970), cited and discussed in
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 959 n. 79. The farmers argued to maintain a key restriction on agricultural
payments they received to avoid being compelled by their landlords to assign their benefits in exchange for the
right to work the land. See id.; see also Hardin, supra note 194, at 62 ("We may not be able to know what were
the views of the workers, women, tenant farmers, and children protected by various pieces of supposedly
paternalistic legislation over the decades, but it is plausible that, had they been able to express a collective will by
voting rather than by individually entering their separate contracts, many of the groups would overwhelmingly
have chosen to restrict themselves as the legislation eventually did.").
197
See, e.g., Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 22 (exploring a variety of property law settings in which "more" is
not deemed better than "less"); EPSTEIN, supra note 190, at 183-84 (explaining how a nexus requirement for land
use exactions could leave owners better off, based on the empirical prediction that the government would not deny
the owner's requested permit if unable to use the denial power to leverage unrelated concessions); see also W.
Stephen Westermann, Strong Versus Standard Property Entitlements: Toward a New Theory of Legal
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Whether or not a particular alienability limit will in fact improve results
for an actor is an empirical question. These limits can often be
conceptualized as legally-imposed precommitment devices, similar to
tearing out one party's (A's) steering wheel during a game of roadway
Chicken with another party, B.198 If B indeed faces a Chicken Game payoff
structure, she will see the precommitment and swerve; A will then come
away with more surplus.199 But if B's ordering of payoffs leads him to drive
straight ahead notwithstanding this precommitment, the removal of A's
steering wheel deprives A of the chance to prevent the "crash" of a thwarted
bargain. In some cases, of course, society has made the judgment that the
harm from such thwarted bargains is preferable to other possible outcomes.
Of particular interest for our purposes is the fact that society may place
one party in a "precommitment" position in an effort to influence the ex
ante incentives of the other party.200 If it is impossible for a person
vulnerable to damaging information to buy silence, for example, it becomes
less likely that damaging information will be acquired in the first place.
Similarly, landowners are prevented from engaging in certain kinds of
bargains over land use rights, on the theory that governmental bodies will
acquire (promulgate and enforce) fewer land use controls if they are unable
to use them as leverage to obtain unrelated or disproportionate benefits from
landowners. Whether such suppositions will play out as hoped depends on
a number of factors, including the costs of acquisition and the other benefits
(if any) that parties derive from the entitlements in question.
For similar reasons, parties might wish to restrict their own power to
buy or sell, or to resist buying or selling. Here, law might offer
precommitment mechanisms that parties could irrevocably elect.201 Ayres
and Madison's default alienability limit for injunctions represents just such a
mechanism.202 Interestingly, their proposal couples a defendant's
Entitlements (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1024081 (arguing that "strong" property entitlements,
which come with built-in limitations on what they may be traded for, offer more autonomy to owners because
they enhance the owner's ability to resist trades).
198
In roadway Chicken, two cars head toward each other on a collision course, each hoping to force the
other to swerve. For a description of the "Chicken" game and strategies within it, see, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET
AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW, 43-45. The idea of tearing out one's own steering wheel as a precommitment
device in a game of Chicken is often attributed to Thomas Schelling; a discussion of this strategy and related
moves appears in HERMAN KAHN, ON ESCALATION: METAPHORS AND SCENARIOS 11 (1965); see also T.C.
Schelling, Uncertainty, Brinksmanship, and the Game of "Chicken," in STRATEGIC INTERACTION AND CONFLICT
74, 82-83 (Kathleen Archibald, ed., 1966) (explaining how an unresponsive or inaccessible steering mechanism
could provide a strategic advantage).
199
See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate
Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1049 n.74 (1995) (noting the bargaining advantage conferred by allowing
one party to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer).
200
Laws that require greater amounts of alienability can also have ex ante effects—both on the initial choice
to acquire an entitlement and on the decision to initiate its transfer. Hence, one effect of civil rights laws may be
to induce those bent on discrimination to select out of certain markets. This effect could further the mission of
antidiscrimination laws by reducing enforcement burdens.
201
I thank Omri Ben-Shahar for comments on this point.
202
See Ayres & Madison, supra note 2.

18-Nov-08]

ADJUSTING ALIENABILITY

43

commitment to not purchase an injunction with a procedure for changing
the amount of damages that the plaintiff will receive in the event she elects
damages rather than an injunction.203 Assuming that the injunction would be
inefficient (the equivalent of a crash in Chicken), the Ayres and Madison
proposal gives the defendant the ability not only to irrevocably remove his
steering wheel but also to set the course of the car in what amounts to
partial swerve, thus making it more likely that the other party will choose to
avoid the crash.204 Auctions can also be cast as precommitment devices that,
by placing binding constraints on a seller's choice set, may yield her a better
outcome.205
B. Inalienability's Edge
We have good reason to be suspicious of inalienability: it can lock
entitlements into inefficient uses. We should not be surprised, then, to see
that the law usually targets other attributes of property when strategic
dilemmas loom. Often this turns out to be just the right move. But
restricting alienability can at times be a fruitful complement to, or substitute
for, other points of intervention into resource tragedies. Moreover, as the
previous section made clear, inalienability is not a single switch to be
thrown but rather a spectrum of approaches for altering control over
transfers. With this in mind, we can consider when and how inalienability
rules might have an edge over alternative treatments of common interest
tragedies—including doing nothing.206
As we have seen, inalienability can affect ex ante incentives to acquire
and use entitlements. Foreseeing the inability to resell, parties self-select
into holding an entitlement based on their propensity to be high-valuing
users of that entitlement over time.207 Of course, when the situation is
examined ex post, the inability to transfer entitlements to higher-valuing
users creates inefficiencies.
Distributive concerns can also arise:
inalienability restricts the choice sets of would-be buyers as well as those of
203

See id. at 79-81.
See id. at 80 (explaining that, counterintuitively, "the defendant is made better off by asking the court to
increase the potential damages it must pay" and describing the resulting strategic interaction); Hugh Ward, The
Risks of a Reputation for Toughness: Strategy in Public Goods Provision Problems Modelled by Chicken
Supergames, 17 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 23, 39 (1987) (discussing a game of Chicken in which "[t]he steering wheel
can be set at various angles," increasing or decreasing the amount that the other party will have to swerve).
205
See, e.g., R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. ECON. LIT. 699, 703 (1987).
206
If serious problems emerge rarely under status quo arrangements, the costs of any intervention may
exceed the benefits. Of course, there is often disagreement about the frequency and severity of particular
dilemmas. For example, compare Brief of Various Law and Economics Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent, ebay v. MercExchange, at 11, 2006 WL 639164 (suggesting lack of empirical support for pervasive
holdup problems) with Brief Amici Curiae of 52 Intellectual Property Professors in Support of Petitioners, ebay v.
MercExchange, at 4, 2006 WL 1785363 (stating that "inappropriate 'holdups' occur on a regular basis under the
Federal Circuit's mandatory-injunction standard").
207
See infra notes 213-217 and accompanying text.
204
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would-be sellers, even though the parties may not be equally responsible for
the miscalculations and failed predictions that placed an entitlement in the
hands of the latter rather than the former. Under what circumstances, then,
would we be willing to tolerate these substantial ex post disadvantages in
order to glean the beneficial ex ante effects of alienability restrictions?
My answer comes in two parts. In the balance of this section, I consider
some circumstances in which alienability limits might work better than
placing pressure on (or only on) property's other margins—acquisition, use,
and exclusion. In the next section, III.C, I consider ways that inalienability
rules might be structured to avoid some of the inefficiency generally
associated with them.
1. Administration and Enforcement Advantages
Because transfers involve at least two parties and are often subject to
regulatory scrutiny for independent reasons, they may be significantly
easier to police than other actions involving resources. Our fish pond
example above showed how inalienability might work as a quick and dirty
de facto harvesting limit, assuming limited appetites and either a limited
access commons or one that is prohibitively difficult for more than a limited
number of people to access. While it seems very unlikely that a noreselling rule will induce optimal harvesting levels, much less get
entitlements to their highest valuers, the administrative convenience of the
system may outweigh such imperfections. It may be a great deal cheaper to
watch for fish leaving the community than it is to monitor the fishing
patterns of the commoners.208
Even where acquisition or use limits are in place, inalienability might
plug gaps in the enforcement of these other limits. While it is easiest to see
how such a backstop would work in the context of a complete ban (as with
the taking of bald eagles), alienability limits might also fortify other sorts of
limits. In these cases, the transfer could provide an occasion for assessing
the transferor's and transferee's right to possess or use the thing.
Alienability limits can also assist in the application of particular criteria to
those accessing resources (such as entitlements to enroll in, attend, and
graduate from a given law school). A complete prohibition on transfers
would permit a single gatekeeper to administer these criteria. An alternative
alienability limit would involve making the criteria "run with the
entitlement" servitude-style,209 so that transfers could freely occur, but only
208
Cf. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31
J. LEGAL STUD. 453 (2002) (noting the lower informational burdens of exclusion as compared with governance).
209
See, e.g., Molly Shaffer Van Hoeweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885 (2008); Glen O.
Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449 (2004).
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to those who met the indicated specifications.210
Of course, enforcing inalienability rules is far from costless. Black
markets may emerge to circumvent alienability limits in many contexts.211
Efforts to structure alienability in particular ways, as through an auction
system, can invite collusive practices that threaten to undermine the goals of
the system.212 But, significantly, other approaches to resource dilemmas
(such as trying to control a common pool resource's depletion through limits
on acquisition or use alone) also create pressures in the direction of illicit
activity. The point, then, is not that inalienability rules are always cheap to
administer in absolute terms, nor even that they are always cheaper than
other alternatives, but only that a comparative analysis should be
undertaken if society has made the determination that some intervention is
appropriate.
2. Overcoming Information Asymmetries
Alienability limits may be attractive when directly limiting acquisition
or use is unduly expensive. A common culprit in these cases is
asymmetrical information.213 Susan Rose-Ackerman has explored how selfselection prompted by alienability restrictions can overcome information
asymmetries in settings like the Homestead Act.214 Rather than have an
administrative agent determine who will be a good homesteader, those who
place a high value on homesteading can be prompted to identify themselves
if enough restrictions are placed on the use and resale of the property.
Likewise, Ayres and Madison have explored how those who highly value
an injunction for its own sake (rather than for its exchange value) could be
prompted to self-select into that remedial form under a regime that bans
reselling the injunction to the defendant.215
The potential to weed out those who are strategically acquiring an
entitlement for resale purposes is especially helpful when society is
reluctant for distributive or other normative reasons to ration access to a
210
While it is hard to imagine a law school granting a dispensation to sell one's seat to, say, anyone who
possesses a particular LSAT score and undergraduate GPA, this approach could work reasonably well in other
settings, such as transmitting one's unused leasehold to a person with a certain credit rating and income level.
211
An extensive literature addresses underground or informal market activity. See, e.g., SUDHIR ALLADI
VENKATESH, OFF THE BOOKS: THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY OF THE URBAN POOR (2006); Symposium: The
Informal Economy, 103 YALE L.J. 1219 (1994). Only a subset of underground activity involves goods that cannot
legally be sold, and only a subset of that subset involves goods that are the subject of stand-alone alienability
limits; many goods that cannot legally be sold (such as illegal drugs) are also illegal to possess or use.
212
See infra notes 248-250.
213
See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 939, 946-48.
214
Id. at 939-40, 946-48. Cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude,
104 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1869-70 (2006) (discussing the self-selection induced by "exclusionary vibes" and
"exclusionary amenities" as alternatives to direct exclusion by a gatekeeper, where potential entrants possess
private information that is costly for the gatekeeper to obtain).
215
Ayres & Madison, supra note 2.
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particular entitlement through direct screening or pricing mechanisms. For
example, suppose an apartment resident plays her trombone very poorly, so
that it causes auditory pain for those in surrounding apartments. Because
budding musicians confront a learning curve, society may be reluctant to
outlaw or fine bad trombone playing, assuming it is confined to reasonable
hours. At the same time, it is almost impossible to distinguish musicians in
the early stages of their training from opportunists hoping to extract
payments from their annoyed neighbors. If the bad-trombone-playing
entitlement is inalienable (whether as a function of law or social norms),216
those who continue to play the trombone badly will do so for their own
reasons, not to gain strategic leverage. Such trombone playing may still be
inefficient in the individual case—perhaps the player lacks talent and will
never improve, and the costs she imposes on her neighbors far exceed the
utility she derives from her attempts to play. But that inefficiency may be
counterbalanced by the benefits of living in a society where people are free
(within limits) to nonstrategically play musical instruments at low skill
levels.217
In other words, we may want to make the entitlement to engage in a
behavior dependent on one's reason for wishing to engage in it. Spite
fences provide another example of this impulse. While it may not be
actionable in a given jurisdiction to have a fence that is homely, an
unsightly fence constructed with the sole intention of annoying one's
neighbor, whether to extract payments or for some other spiteful purpose,
may give rise to a cause of action.218 The problem is that it can be very
difficult to tell why a particular fence has been constructed.219 Here, we
might view an interest in selling the entitlement as evidentiary on the
question of intent.220 Alienability restrictions could screen out those
building for strategic reasons, although they would offer no relief against a
truly spiteful fence-builder for whom seeing a neighbor suffer is payment
216
Social norms, rather than legal prohibitions, seem to be doing the work in examples like the one in the
text. Not only may people intuitively appreciate the strategic risks of paying a neighbor to stop doing something,
offering cash to one's neighbor to stop playing an instrument couples a direct insult with the interjection of money
into a setting where it is likely to seem inappropriate.
217
To be sure, we could imagine variations on the entitlement regime, such as a "learner's permit" that
allows the poor playing of a musical instrument to continue for only a certain period of time before it becomes
enjoinable. Such a regime would be administratively costly, however, and would require difficult qualitative
judgments.
218
See, e.g., POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 62.05, Spite Fences (noting divided authority on the point, but
suggesting that "[t]he trend of modern decisions appears to favor the view that a spite fence that serves no useful
or beneficial purpose is unlawful"); Ward Farnsworth, The Economics of Enmity, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 211, 234-35
(2002) (noting the varying treatment of spite fences).
219
See Farnsworth, supra note 218, at 235 (noting "the administrative cost of identifying true spite fences
and separating them from the look-alikes").
220
For an extended treatment of this idea in the blackmail context, see Berman, supra note 59. The same
evidentiary argument would explain the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act's inclusion of an offer to sell
a domain name among the factors relevant to the bad faith inquiry. See Ned Snow, The Constitutional Failing of
the Anticybersquatting Act, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 70 & n. 477 (2005) (citing S. Rep. No. 106-140, at 15
(1999)).
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enough. Moreover, by blocking potential bargains, such rules risk leaving
in place inefficiently ugly but earnestly constructed fences.
A similar argument might be attempted with respect to the limits on
land use exactions contained in the Nollan221 and Dolan cases.222 The
decisions reflect the Court's anxiety about strategic acquisition (here,
enactment of land use regulations) for later resale to burdened landowners.
In this context, substantive checks on acquisition seem both feasible and
plainly superior to indirect attempts to influence acquisition incentives
through alienability limits.223 But suppose that, for whatever mix of
normative or structural reasons, courts do not wish to restrict the ability of
local governments to enact any sincerely desired land use regulation. Local
governmental sincerity may be as difficult to detect as good faith attempts
at trombone playing. If so, and if land use regulations resold to landowners
for unrelated or disproportionate benefits are, on average, less sincerely
desired than those that are not resold in that manner, then the bargaining
restrictions might lead local governments to enact a larger proportion of
sincerely desired restrictions.
Of course, the argument falls apart if one believes that substantive
criteria beyond sincerity should control local governmental land use
enactments, or if one thinks that sincerely enacted land use regulations are
frequently traded off against other goods for the community. There are
other reasons to be leery of alienability limits in this context as well: ex
post pressures make such alienability limits difficult to sustain,224 and to the
extent they are enforced, they unfairly restrict the choice set of the would-be
purchaser (landowner) who had no hand in the government's ex ante
decision to acquire the entitlement.225
3. Preserving Autonomy
Exclusion limits, such as a downgrading of property rule protection to
liability rule protection, offer one response to resource dilemmas, as we
have seen. But liability rules carry some well-known costs. There may be
direct effects on incentives as well as more distant effects on expectations
about property. Valuation concerns are often dominant in discussions about
liability rules—the amount of compensation paid under the liability rule

221

Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IOWA L.
REV. 1 (2000).
224
See, e.g., David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1243,
1286-1302 (1997) (discussing circumvention of the Nollan and Dolan bargaining limits)
225
See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 223, at 4 (arguing that the limits in Nollan and Dolan disable landowners
from making certain kinds of beneficial bargains, while failing to meaningfully protect them from overregulation).
222
223
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may be deemed inadequate.226 While it may be possible to address these
concerns by using techniques like self-assessed valuations,227 these
approaches are sometimes disfavored for their complexity or their perceived
distributive effects.
More fundamentally, liability rules deprive the entitlement holder of a
form of autonomy—control over the fact of the transfer.228 That the
entitlement can be removed without the entitlement-holder's consent might
seem independently objectionable in some settings, even if the price paid is
quite adequate. Of course, a complete ban on alienability would also
deprive the owner of control over the fact of the transfer (albeit in a
different way) by forcing her to retain the entitlement forever.229 Yet it is
possible to devise alienability limits that leave the usual degree of choice
about the fact of the transfer with the entitlement-holder,230 while specifying
a set of limits that will apply once the choice to transfer has been made.
The content of these limits may, in turn, induce self-selection by those who
are unlikely to hold out for strategic reasons. Alternatively, the limits may
determine the way that surplus will be assigned to forestall bargaining
breakdowns. To take a simple example, price caps would leave the choice
of whether to sell with the owner, but would limit returns from any sale that
does occur, influencing both who will become an owner in the first place
and the later course of bargaining.231
Some alienability limits, such as holding periods or criteria that buyers
must meet, would operate to thin the market for the entitlement and make
the "fact of the transfer" less likely. While this does dilute the owner's
holdings and increases the chance that resources will be locked up in
inefficient uses, it arguably interferes with autonomy somewhat less than a
forced or prohibited transfer.

226
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106
YALE L.J. 2091, 2093 (1997) (discussing the risk of undercompensation associated with liability rules).
227
See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 VA. L. REV. 771
(1982); Michael Abramowicz, The Law-and-Markets Movement, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 327 364-73, 389-93 (1999);
Fennell, supra note 183. It would also be possible to use alienability limits as part of a mechanism designed to
elicit truthful valuations. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 871 (2007) (combining self-assessed valuation for purposes of eminent domain compensation with
restrictions on selling below the self-assessed amount in the event the government chose not to go forward with
the taking); Parchomovsky, supra note 44, at 232-36 (proposing an auction mechanism for allocating contested
domain names followed by a two-year period of inalienability).
228
See, e.g., Morris, supra note 173, at 842; see also CHRISTMAN, supra note 173, at 19, 167 (associating
liability rules with a lack of control, and explaining that "control rights serve autonomy interests");
229
Morris, supra note 173, at 842.
230
By "usual degree of choice" I mean the middle column in Figure 2, in which the owner and the nonowner
must both agree to the transfer. Put options, which would permit an owner to force a transfer, represent another
alternative and will be discussed below. See infra Part III.C.1.
231
For discussion of the impact of price caps and similar restrictions on bargaining, see, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra
note 190, at 57-58; Ayres & Madison, supra note 2, at 103-05.
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C. Inalienability Without Anxiety
Refinements to inalienability rules can reduce, often dramatically, the
inefficiencies that would otherwise attend them. A couple of concrete ideas
will help to flesh out some of the possibilities.
1. Adding Put Options
Often, the costs of inalienability can be greatly reduced by pairing a ban
on sales or other transfers with a "put option" that gives the entitlement
holder the right to force a transfer of the entitlement to a specified party,
typically a governmental agency or other central body, at a preset price.232
Ordinary alienability requires the willing cooperation of a buyer233 (or other
recipient)234 and hence does not amount to an enforceable "right" against
another party.235 Put options amount to just such a right, and hence may be
attractive complements to limits on alienability.
Of course, the right to abandon property, to the extent it exists,236 can be
couched as a standing put option with a strike price of zero. However,
abandoned property may create large transaction costs. Other actors must
determine that the property is abandoned before making a claim, during
which time the property sits unused, or, worse, deteriorates. Clear
abandonment protocols can reduce these costs, but only if erstwhile owners
are willing to comply with the protocol. That result is more likely if the
costs of doing so are low or are reimbursed, or if entitlement holders have
232

See, e.g., Morris, supra note 173, at 854-56 (discussing put options). Put options may be explicit, as on
financial markets, or they may be embedded in background legal rules or contractual arrangements. See, e.g.,
George S. Geis, An Embedded Options Theory of Indefinite Contracts, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1664 (2006).
233
In relatively narrow circumstances, persons benefited by the actions of others can be required to
compensate the actor. Such a legal rule would grant the actor an embedded put option. See Abraham Bell &
Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 556, 602-03 (2001) (explaining how a landowner's liability to
the government for favorable governmental actions would effectively grant the government a put option with a
nonzero exercise price).
234
Even gifts require acceptance, although this element may be readily implied. See, e.g., Gruen v. Gruen,
496 N.E.2d. 869 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1986) ("Acceptance by the donee is essential to the validity of an inter vivos gift,
but when a gift is of value to the donee, as it is here, the law will presume an acceptance on his part."). Christman,
however, uses the example of gifts to argue that "alienation is unilateral" and distinguishes it from "exchange,"
which he describes as "a contingent and conditional act." CHRISTMAN, supra note 173, at 129. Presumably, this
analysis is based on the fact that the overwhelming majority of donees do accept the gifts they are given, although
the law does not constrain them to do so. See also PENNER, supra note 177, at 80-85 (extrapolating from
abandonment to find a unilateral right to transfer property).
235
See, e.g., Rizzolli, supra note 2 at §3.1 (noting that from a Hohfeldian perspective, "under a property rule,
the owner does not have the right to sell as there is no corresponding duty of others to buy the entitlement");
WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND
OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 36-42 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923) (distinguishing rights from privileges); Honoré,
supra note 5, at 173 ("In deference to the view that the exercise of a right must depend on the choice of the holder,
I have refrained from calling transmissibility a right.") (citations omitted).
236
See, e.g., PENNER, supra note 177, at 79-80 (discussing the owner's right to cede possession but noting
limits on that right, such as those attending the disposal of hazardous wastes); Strahilevitz, supra note 185; cf.
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781 (2005) (examining the common law right to
destroy and limits on it).
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their own reasons for complying. As to this last point, consider laws that
offer new parents the option of abandoning babies in designated places,
such as fire stations, appealing to the parental desire to safeguard the child's
wellbeing.237 "Use or lose" provisions like those applicable to water rights,
or the "monitor or lose" rule associated with adverse possession, are closely
related to the ideas of structured abandonment and put options.238 Here,
one relinquishes the entitlement and receives a "payment" in the form of
relief from monitoring or use in settings where those activities have become
costly on net.
To these "embedded put options," we might wish to add put options
with positive prices, if alienability will be otherwise restricted.239 In the case
of domain names, for example, one concern is that the stock of useful,
attractive, and easy-to-remember words and phrases will be depleted by the
stockpiling or hoarding of names.240 Although an inalienability regime
would remove the incentive to buy and hold names for resale,241 it could
also take valuable names out of commission over time. Allowing holders
who no longer need the names to return them to the issuing agency and
receive a fee would provide a way of quickly reclaiming those names for
use by others. Similarly, if normative considerations point toward making
grandfathered fishing rights inalienable, the inefficiency of leaving rights
"out" with people who are no longer using them could be eliminated with a
buyback program.242
Where a positive strike price is set for a put option, two potential
worries follow. First is the concern that wasteful acquisition will occur just
to exercise the option.243 This can be controlled by keeping the exercise
price equal to or lower than the present-value equivalent of the cost of
initial acquisition, or by requiring the entitlement to have been owned for
237
See, e.g., Abandoned Newborn Infant Protection Act, 325 Ill. Comp. Stat. 2/1 (establishing procedures for
relinquishing newborn infants, and stating that relinquishment in accordance with the Act creates a rebuttable
presumption that the parent consents to termination of parental rights as to that infant).
238
See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 22, at 650-660 (discussing "use or lose" provisions and the inertia to
which they respond).
239
Explicit puts may also be useful in reducing deadweight losses in settings where serious impediments to
marketability exist. In this connection, consider the practice of offering households going through foreclosure a
lump sum if they leave the home behind in good condition. See Michael M. Phillips, Buyers' Revenge: Trash the
House After Foreclosure, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2008 (online edition) (discussing "cash for key" approach in
which homeowners are paid "hundreds or even thousands of dollars to put their anger in escrow and leave
quietly").
240
See David J. Franklyn, Owning Words in Cyberspace: The Accidental Trademark Regime, 2001 Wis. L.
Rev. 1251, 1278.
241
See id. at 1275-77 (discussing the impacts of domain name alienability).
242
See John L. McMullan & David C. Perrier, Lobster Poaching and the Ironies of Law Enforcement, 36
LAW & SOC. REV. 679, 685 (2002) (discussing lobster boat buy-back pursuant to a Nova Scotia regulatory
regime) (citing A. SCOTT & M. TUGWELL, PUBLIC REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL FISHERIES IN CANADA—THE
MARITIME LOBSTER FISHERY (Economic Council of Canada, Technical Report No. 16, 1981)).
243
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Protecting Property Rights with Legal Remedies: A Common Sense Reply
to Professor Ayres, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 833, 844 (discussing the perverse incentive to pollute that would exist
under a put option regime in which parties are paid not to pollute).
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some period before the put option was announced (or anticipated).244
Second, if inalienability is designed to serve intrinsic ends by keeping an
individual from parting with a particular entitlement, the put option would
operate against that goal, although less strongly than would the prospect of
open-market sales. Hence, put options are likely to be most attractive where
intrinsic considerations do not dominate and where the costs of initial
acquisition can be reliably estimated.
It is important to emphasize how a put option differs from the "call
options" that are the stuff of ordinary liability rules. Unlike giving the
government or some other centralized body the power to take away the
entitlement for a price, the put option leaves control over the fact of the
transaction with the entitlement's owner.245 So long as the entitlement is
valued for its use by its owner, it can be maintained for that purpose without
interference; the choice to force a sale lies with her, not with the
government. In some settings, this arrangement may be normatively
desirable.
2. Specifying Transfer Protocols
Another way to approach alienability restrictions is by specifying
particular transfer protocols that must be followed in the event the owner
chooses to alienate the entitlement. The required use of sealed-bid secondprice (or "Vickrey") auctions,246 for example, would help to select against
strategic acquisition of entitlements that are valuable only to a single
identifiable party. In this type of auction, bidders submit their valuations
via sealed bids and the highest bidder receives the entitlement—but at the
price bid by the second-highest bidder.247 This setup is thought to induce
bids that reflect true valuations; a bidder who idiosyncratically values an
entitlement more than everyone else need not fear that she will end up
paying any portion of her extra, idiosyncratic increment of value.248 While
244
For example, some states and localities have begun experimenting with buybacks of environmentally
harmful older cars, although careful design is necessary to make sure people do not resurrect dinosaurs from
junkyards just to claim the payment. See Alan S. Blinder, A Modest Proposal: Eco-Friendly Stimulus, N.Y.
Times, July 27, 2008 (explaining that a "Cash for Clunkers" program might specify that "only vehicles that had
been registered and driven for, say, the past year would be eligible").
245
See Ayres, supra note 90, at 808 ("under a call option, the fate of the initial entitlement's holder is
decided by the other side, but under a put option, the initial entitlement holder decides her own fate").
246
See William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J. FIN. 8, 20
(1961) (describing the second-price auction).
247
See Vickrey, supra note 246, at 20.
248
See Vickrey, supra note 246, at 20-21 (observing that, in the absence of collusion, "the optimal strategy
for each bidder . . . will obviously be to make his bid equal to the full value of the article or contract to himself"
and explaining why higher or lower bids would not be rational). But see, e.g., Jack L. Knetsch et al., The
Endowment Effect and Repeated Market Trials: Is the Vickrey Auction Demand Revealing?, 4 EXPERIMENTAL
ECON. 257 (2001) (questioning, based on experiments with second and ninth price auctions, the demandrevealing properties of Vickrey auctions); John H. Kagel, Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research, in THE
HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 510, 508-11, 513 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth, eds., 1995)
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other auction types (including ordinary first-price auctions) will produce the
same expected revenue to the seller if certain assumptions hold,249 secondprice auctions place the highest valuer's extra increment of value off limits
with greater transparency and certainty.250 A Vickrey auction makes
strategic acquisition undertaken solely for purposes or reselling to an
identifiable high valuer clearly unprofitable, while leaving intact the
incentives that the rest of the market provides.
Consider how this approach might play out in the blackmail context.
One of the abiding sub-puzzles of blackmail is why so-called "market price"
blackmail is illegal.251 In this type of blackmail, the information involved
has a market value (say, to a tabloid), and hence its procurement cannot be
said to have been a total waste, at least if one equates willingness to pay
with some social value.252 If we would find nothing wrong with the sale of
the information to the tabloid, why should the person who stands to lose
reputational capital by its release not be able to bid against the tabloid? 253
Such a counterbid to suppress the information might seem little different in
principle from the Nature Conservancy bidding against developers to gain
control of land in order to protect it from use. One explanation might be
simple administrative ease—it is too difficult to tell when another bidder is
really present, or to determine that bidder's valuation.254 But there may also
be efficiency concerns about allowing the prospect of recovering from the
blackmailee to drive decisions about information acquisition. In addition,
there may be distributive concerns about allowing the blackmailer to claim
a share of the large surplus by which the blackmailee's valuation exceeds
that of the nearest market competitor.
These concerns could be addressed by requiring that damaging
information about another person be alienated to that person only through a
(discussing experimental results showing bids above the "dominant strategy price" in second-price auctions, but
finding that a larger proportion of second-price than first-price sealed bids are within $.05 of true valuations). For
a discussion of second-price auctions and similar mechanisms, see, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky, Trademarks,
Domain Names, and Internal Auctions, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 211.
249
See Vickrey, supra note 246, at 28; R. Preston McCaffee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J.
ECON. LIT. 699, 707-710 (1987) (discussing the "Revenue-Equivalence Theorem" and its dependence on certain
"benchmark" assumptions).
250
See Vickrey, supra note 246, at 28 (suggesting that switching to the "first-rejected-bid" pricing of a
second-price auction could achieve gains from "greater certainty of obtaining a Pareto-optimal result and from the
reduction in non-productive expenditure devoted to the sizing-up of the market by the bidders"). Measures would
be necessary to control the risk of false "second bids" by those colluding with the seller. See id. at 22 ("To
prevent the use of a 'shill' to jack the price up by putting in a late bid just under the top bid, it would probably be
desirable to have all bids delivered to and certified by a trustworthy holder, who would then deliver all bids
simultaneously to the seller.").
251
See, e.g., Berman, supra note 59, at 857 (describing "market price blackmail" as "one of the most
complex riddles within the blackmail puzzle"); id. at 857- 60 (discussing and citing literature on this topic).
252
See Hardin, supra note 94 at 1806.
253
For a detailed argument that such blackmail fits within the framework of mutual advantage, see Hardin,
supra note 94, at 1803-07.
254
See, e.g., id., at 1806; Sidney W. DeLong, Blackmailers, Bribe-Takers, and the Second Paradox, 141 U.
PA. L. REV. 1663, 1675-77 (1993).
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second-price auction. The blackmailer would only be able to get what the
top-paying tabloid would be willing to pay, and the blackmailee would have
to pay no more than that, regardless of how high her valuation might be.
Robert Nozick argues for this economic result in discussing the suppression
of marketable information:
[A] seller of such silence could legitimately charge only
for what he forgoes by silence. . . . So, someone writing a
book, whose research comes across information about
another person which would help sales if included in the
book, may charge another who desires that this information
be kept secret (including the person who is the subject of the
information) for refraining from including the information in
the book. He may charge an amount of money equal to his
expected difference in royalties between the book containing
this information and the book without it; he may not charge
the best price he could get from the purchaser of his
silence.255
A second-price auction offers a way of operationalizing this idea that would
sidestep some of the practical concerns scholars have raised about it.256
The domain name situation could be addressed similarly. A registrant
acquiring "vw.net"257 could offer it for sale, but only through a second-price
auction.258 The registrant would be unable to exercise leverage against
Volkswagen based on that company's idiosyncratically high valuation. If
Volkswagen were the high bidder, it would receive the domain name, while
the registrant would receive only the amount (if any) that a second party
was willing to bid. If there were no second bid, the domain name would be
255

NOZICK, supra note 58, at 85-86.
See, e.g., DeLong, supra note 254, at 1675-76. Some difficulties, such as the problem of defining what
the parties are bidding on without giving away the information itself, would remain. See, e.g., id.; Richard H.
McAdams, Group Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2272-77 (1996). In addition, such an
auction would only offer a workable solution in instances in which the information is fully controlled by a single
blackmailer; otherwise, it would not be within the power of the blackmailer to "convey" the information to the
high-bidding blackmailee in a way that would truly take it off the market. I thank Stephanie Stern for this point.
Because the blackmailer's ability to deliver an "exclusive" to a tabloid is likely the source of any significant
market potential for the information in the first place, however, the second-price solution could work well in those
instances for which it is designed.
257
The domain name "vw.net" was at issue in Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 238 F.3d
264 (4th Cir. 2001).
258
Gideon Parchomovsky has also proposed using an auction mechanism to resolve disputes over domain
names. Parchomovsky, supra note 248, at 229-40. Significantly, his proposal (which differs from mine in a
number of other respects) would allow a trademark holder to force a domain name owner to participate in a
process which could involuntarily divest the owner of the entitlement (with compensation at the level bid by the
owner). See id. at 232-33. His proposal thus represents a type of contingent liability rule in which control over
the fact of the transfer itself depends on who turns out to be the high bidder. The idea of using auctions to assign
domain names in the first instance has also been explored. See Karl M. Manheim & Lawrence B. Solum, An
Economic Analysis of Domain Name Policy, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 359, 457-82 (2003).
256
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transferred for free. Foreseeing this, the registrant would not resort to the
auction unless there were at least one other party interested in the name.
This, in turn, would remove ex ante incentives to acquire a name solely to
exert leverage against a single party with an exceptionally high valuation.
Such an approach has its limits. It works best in situations where a
single party values the good much more highly than everyone else, and
where few, if any, legitimate bargains would be thwarted as a result of the
rule. Often times, these criteria are not met. For example, a patent holder
who has added a great deal of social value might nonetheless have only one
plausible buyer. Alternatively, a patent holder who has added little or no
value could wield monopoly power against many parties simultaneously.
Coercive threats of other sorts may also have broad audiences, as seen in
the "Saving Toby" scenario in which the owner of an adorable bunny posted
an internet threat to kill and eat the creature unless viewers sent in
$50,000.259 Nonetheless, because some anxiously alienable goods have
features amenable to second-price auctions, applications of this protocol are
worth considering in greater depth.
More generally, we might consider other kinds of transfer procedures
capable of cutting through bargaining dilemmas without unduly blocking
useful transactions. The basic idea is to leave control over the transaction in
the entitlement holder's hands while specifying surplus-dividing procedures
that must apply in the event the entitlement holder decides to make a
transfer and a buyer decides to accept it. Any set of nonnegotiable surplusdividing rules will sidestep bargaining dilemmas, and distributive goals can
be accommodated by adjusting the content of the rules. These points have
been well-recognized in the context of liability rules, which always specify
a division of surplus. Indeed, the idea that jointly-chosen transactions might
occur at a pre-stated price can be found embedded in the liability rule
literature on crafting remedies.260 But combining wholly voluntary
transactions with mandatory, impasse-avoiding procedures is a powerful
and flexible concept whose true roots lie not in the unilaterally imposed
transactions of liability rules but rather in inalienability. Recognizing
259
See Stephen E. Sachs, Saving Toby: Extortion, Blackmail, and the Right To Destroy, 24 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 251 (2006).
260
See Ayres & Goldbart, supra note 182, at 9-10, 34-37 (2001) (describing "dual chooser rules"); Ronen
Avraham, Modular Liability Rules, 24 INT'L REV. L & ECON. 269 (2004) (describing "modular liability rules").
These authors introduce rules constructed from call and put options that give both parties a say in whether a
particular remedy will apply. Although consistently described as "liability rules" the resulting arrangements are
the functional equivalent of granting one party an entitlement that may be voluntarily transferred, subject to an
alienability limit in the form of a mandatory, nonnegotiable price. For example, the "defendant-presumption"
variety of "dual chooser rule" specifies that the defendant receives the entitlement (say, to continue operating her
factory) unless both parties agree that it should be transferred to the plaintiff upon payment of an amount specified
by the court. See Ayres & Goldbart, supra note 182at 34. A converse rule would start by presumptively granting
the entitlement to the plaintiff (say, to have the factory shut down) and specifying that if (and only if) both parties
agree, the entitlement will be transferred to the defendant at the preset damages price selected by the court. See
Avraham, supra, at 297 (providing an example of the court's instructions to the parties under such a rule).
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alienability as an alternative margin for adjusting property entitlements
clears a space for new innovations in overcoming strategic dilemmas.
D. Taking Stock
As should be evident by now, inalienability's role in resolving collective
action problems is fundamentally interstitial. Whether inalienability rules
offer the best chance for increasing surplus or achieving other goals in a
given context is a comparative inquiry that turns on the feasibility, efficacy,
and normative desirability of other courses of action, including doing
nothing. The case for considering inalienability rules is at its apex when a
decision has already been made to intervene into property entitlements in
some manner and the other candidate interventions involve significant costs
along one or more of the margins identified above—administrability,
information asymmetries, or autonomy—for which inalienability may have
a comparative advantage. Alienability limits deserve a fair hearing in such
instances, and giving them one requires recognizing the full range of
potential inalienability rules and the many ways in which they might be
structured to minimize the disadvantages associated with blocking trades.
If we think that a heightened degree of openness to inalienability rules
could improve the flexibility and efficacy with which society addresses
strategic dilemmas, how should that openness be operationalized? Here it is
important to recognize that restrictions on alienability may be sought by
either public or private entities, may restrain either public or private entities,
and may serve purposes that fall anywhere along the spectrum from fully
private to fully public. Law must decide when to enact and enforce public
alienability limits, when to enforce private alienability limits, and when to
permit private parties to act collectively to restrict alienability. This paper
has not sharply differentiated among these choices, much less argued for
any particular enactment, legal doctrine, or institutional arrangement. My
focus has instead been on the analytic case for making inalienability rules
part of the picture at all. Yet it is worth emphasizing that there are many
different ways in which alienability limits might be operationalized, all of
which offer avenues for future research.261

261
Again, the analogy to liability rules is instructive. In addition to examining liability rules as mandatory
legal rules, scholars have explored the potential of opt-in regimes featuring such rules. See, e.g., Robert P.
Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84
Cal. L. Rev. 1293 (1996).
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CONCLUSION
Inalienability has been treated as a curiosity by property scholars, a
special topic imbued with exceptional normative content, hived off from
the rough and tumble of ordinary resource struggles. This paper has
endeavored to reveal another side of inalienability. Like other core property
attributes, alienability represents a dimension that can be adjusted to address
tragedies of the commons and the anticommons. Because these resource
dilemmas are ubiquitous, recognizing inalienability's role in their resolution
should bring this underappreciated property attribute out of the shadows.
Perhaps most interestingly, alienability adjustments offer a way to address
monopoly power while leaving exclusion rights, and the autonomy interests
that they are often thought to serve, fully intact.
To recognize this new side of inalienability is not, of course, to suggest
that such restrictions are always or even frequently superior to limits on
acquisition, use, or exclusion. Very often, other margins offer better points
of intervention, and even where they do not, nonintervention may be
preferable to the inefficiencies that inevitably come from blocking desired
exchanges. Nonetheless, there are some areas in which it seems likely that
properly formulated alienability limits could play an important role. Just as
there are many imaginable variations on property rules and liability rules,
there are many ways that alienability might be altered to address resource
tragedies—yet very few of the latter have received explicit consideration by
property scholars. This paper thus hopes to open the door to more
innovation in inalienability.
Equally important is the payoff for property theory of working through
the source and meaning of the anxiety surrounding certain kinds of
transfers. I have suggested here that this anxiety has its roots not only in
distributive concerns but also in worries about the inefficiency that may
follow strategic acquisitions for resale. Although a typical approach to
those worries is to dilute the strength of exclusion rights and thereby allow
transfers to occur more easily, an intriguing alternative is to make transfers
harder to accomplish. By illuminating alienability's place in the
constellation of property attributes, I hope to counterbalance in some
measure the current trend to view property, and adjustments to it, solely in
terms of exclusion. However fruitful debates about the choice between
property rules and liability rules have been, it is time to make room in the
discussion for inalienability rules.
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